

# New Welfare Narratives in Italy: Risks and supposed Virtues

laura.cataldi@unito.it  
valeria.cappellato@unito.it

Department of Cultures, Politics and Society  
University of Turin (Italy)

## *Abstract*

In Italy, for some years, a series of new terms, such as ‘Civil Welfare’, ‘Community Welfare’, ‘Welfare Society’, ‘Generative Welfare’, and ‘Second Welfare’, have appeared in public discourse. These labels refer to welfare discourses with different origins and traditions. Some sets of ideas have a Catholic matrix, such as the ‘Civil Welfare’ (Zamagni 2015) and the “Welfare Society” (Donati 1993, 2015); others are professed as secular, such as ‘Second Welfare’ (Ferrera 2010). Others, though in the wake of the European debate, have developed a largely autonomous reflection, such as the ‘Generative Welfare’ (Vecchiato 2013), promoted by the Zancan Foundation. Finally, others seem to refer to international debates, but they do not actually know them, using some key concepts only for their “positive flavor”, such as the ‘Community Welfare’ compared to ‘Community Care’. However, all of them are reform narratives promoting ‘new’ welfare-mix solutions to ensure the sustainability of the social protection system in the face of the permanent austerity (Pierson 1998, 2001) and the crisis of the public welfare. Moreover, all of them are presented as recalibration strategies betting on coordination, integration, networking, and synergy’s capabilities of formal and informal components of the welfare system, reinforcing the role, not of the state, but of the other points of the so-called ‘diamond’ (Ferrera 2006): individuals and families, third sector, but also companies and market. The contribution aims to critically present the different narratives, highlighting their similarities and differences, and – above all – to discuss their implications. For this purpose, the promises to provide sustainable, flexible, and plural welfare solutions (Osborne 2006), as well as the presumed advantages and the risks of what appears to be a strategy of delegation to the private sector, will be subject of careful evaluation.

## **Introduction**

This paper intends to present and discuss the new welfare narratives that have emerged and have been formalized in Italy in the last 10 years: the Second Welfare (Ferrera 2010), the (New) Welfare Society (Donati 2015), the Generative Welfare (Vecchiato 2013), the Civil Welfare (Zamagni 2015a, 2015b), but also the label ‘community welfare’ drown out from the ideal of community care in a very generic way and without understanding the terms of the international debate. These “discursive objects”, or set of ideas, have different degrees of structuring and internal coherence, as well as different origins and traditions, but all of them prefigure paths to reform the current welfare system.

The social-cultural and economic context in the emergence of the rhetorical constructions<sup>1</sup> we will present obviously matters. A fundamental coordinate is undoubtedly provided by the Southern European or Mediterranean model (Ferrera 1996). The characteristics of the Mediterranean – and Italian – model as it appeared in the 1990s, but to a large extent still occurs, are: 1) a “mixed” public intervention method, based on insurance programs linked to the employment position in the field of pensions, and a universalistic system in health care; 2) an accentuated “dualism”, i.e. differentiation, in the access to social protection based on placement in the labour market, so that there are more

---

<sup>1</sup>The adjective ‘rhetorical’ is used to highlight how in these constructions of meaning the value and normative component and, ultimately, the function of legitimation through persuasion are fundamental.

protected figures, such as employees in the public sector and workers in large companies, and less protected figures, such as workers in small businesses, seasonal workers, precarious, unemployed, etc.; 2) poor development and support of welfare policies against the risk of poverty; 4) the high particularism, often characterized in terms of clientelism; 5) the strong familism, or, better, the low degree of defamilisation, to the extent that many care tasks are left to the families, without even the state support through monetary transfers or fiscal interventions typical of conservative-corporate regime countries (Pavolini and Raitano 2015, 11-12).

These reasons have led many scholars to advocate a welfare recalibration (see *inter al.* Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003), i.e. structural rearrangement of the social protection system.

However, the path of reforms undertaken has largely failed. In the 1990s, Italian technical and center-left governments supported and envisaged a two-stage transformation strategy: a first phase of organizational and cost rationalization through the implementation of restrictive pension reforms and greater liberalization, and a second phase of new welfare investment programs. The second phase has never arrived (Agostini and Ascoli 2014), so it is correct to admit not only that the recalibration was incomplete (Natali 2009), but also that the reform processes have gone in the direction of retrenchment and “freezing” rather than of recalibration (Ascoli 2011).

The term “freezing” reflects the fact that the Italian social protection system always presents the three same distortions. The first is the so-called functional distortion: protection against the main social risks is unequal, as it is clear from the fact that in 2011 pension expenditure accounted for 60% of social spending, 17% of GDP (ISTAT 2011 data). The second one is the territorial distortion, i.e. the North-South fracture of the country, connected to the different institutional capacity of local contexts (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). The third one is the distributional distortion, along two cleavages: a generational cleavage, for which a good level of protection is ensured for people over 64 years *vs.* all others, and a cleavage between occupational groups, between insiders (workers) and outsiders (non-workers, unemployed, undeclared workers...) (Titmuss 1958), but also between different occupational categories, between insiders and mid-siders, i.e. low-protected workers (Jessoula, Madama, and Graziano 2010).

## **The Second Welfare Narrative**

In 2010, the term “Second Welfare” (in Italian, “Secondo Welfare”- hereafter 2W) appeared for the first time on the pages and blogs of one of the major Italian newspapers, as the result of a long-distance dialogue between the journalist Dario Di Vico and Maurizio Ferrera (see Ferrera 2010), one of the most famous Italian welfare scholars, as well as a leading exponent of the European and international epistemic community of the same research field.

The idea of 2W is that of “a welfare supported by private individuals that supports and integrates the public sector” (Maino 2012, 835). A new configuration of welfare mix “in which state, market, private social and citizens collaborate to synergistically produce solutions and responses for the wellbeing of individuals and families, i.e. the recipients of the interventions” (Maino 2013, 26, and 2015).

Proponents of the 2W explicitly see it as a solution to prevent the retreat of the welfare state, and as an alternative to privatization tout court. Facing a situation strongly transformed by globalization and europeanization, permanent austerity (Pierson 1998, 2001) and the 2008 crisis as an accelerating factor, the state (the public welfare state) is in the need to contain public spending and to deal with the emergence of new risks and social needs, connected to the transition to post-industrial society. Borrowing the image used by Ferrera (2017, 11), the state is in between the anvil and the hammer, in

a situation in which “the ‘hammer’ of [increasing] needs has perhaps struck more than the ‘anvil’ of [decreasing] resources”.

The first feature of 2W is that it mobilizes additional non-public (i.e. private) resources.

The adjective “second” has a double connotation:


- temporal, because 2W is grafted on the “first” welfare, the one built by the state during the twentieth century, especially during the glorious thirty years (1945-1975);
- functional, because 2W is added to the schemes of the “first” welfare, integrates its gaps and stimulates its modernization.

Its main theorists and supporters specify that the first welfare is not replaced or questioned, especially in its redistributive function, but integrated from the outside where there are unmet/ unsatisfied demands (Ferrera 2013, 8; see also Ferrera and Maino 2014, 1-2).

In Maino’s definition (2015), it is a new governance structure in which the creation of multi-stakeholder networks is central.

Indeed, actors of 2W are multiple: companies; insurance companies; family, corporate, banking, and community foundations; labor unions; employer associations; social enterprises; cooperatives; voluntary associations, etc. However, public institutions and, in particular, local authorities play an important role. In fact, in the welfare diamond (Ferrera 2006), the state – in its various articulations – has a supra-ordered role: it is the “container” of all well-being production processes, formal and informal, public and non-public, and, above all, it is the “sovereign regulator” of these processes (Maino 2013, 26). Therefore, 2W should consist of “collaboration” and “synergy” between the four spheres that make up the diamond of welfare (Ferrera 2006) – state, market, third sector and citizens – and should give rise to a virtuous circle (Maino 2013, 26).

**Figure 1:** Diamond of welfare and 2W



Source: Ferrera (2006) and Maino (2013)

Taking shape through networks and multi-stakeholder policy arenas, 2W seems to give rise to a plural and pluralist system like the one advocated by Osborne (2006).

Ferrera argues that “the concept of 2W remains open from a descriptive point of view and neutral from an evaluative point of view” (2015, 7), because “it is based *on what we observe* (and *not necessarily what we would like to happen*)”, “in a context of permanent austerity”(Ferrera 2017, 7).

Two elements lead us to think that 2W is not simply a descriptive-analytical and evaluatively neutral category, but rather, like any other reform rhetoric, a political proposal. First, 2W formulates

promises, as evidenced by the articles and reports published so far. The most important promises are: ensuring the sustainability of the welfare system, filling public sector gaps, triggering virtuous circles, fostering social innovation, promoting a lighter welfare. Second, 2W presupposes *ex ante* an element to fulfill its promises, system integration.

One might wonder why Ferrera and his group preferred to invent a new label instead of using the term “private welfare” which would highlight not only the elements of change, but also the lines of continuity of the phenomenon<sup>2</sup>.

Ferrera (2017, 13) states that 2W “is not ‘private’ welfare [...] since a very important part of resources is the result of collective mobilization and organization of funds that would not otherwise be [...] available for the sphere of welfare”. From his words we infer that 2W is not private welfare *tout court*, because it presupposes coordination between actors, not only in the private sector, but also between private and public sectors. In fact, coordination is essential for system integration. Too bad that integration is not at all a result that can be taken for granted and is rather *the* issue to investigate in 2W. Integration is only a possible overall effect of the (networked) system in which the interweaving of different structural variables and relational dynamics has great relevance (Cataldi 2018).

In 2W, some “strong actors” of the private sphere play an important role. These actors belong to both the third sector and the for-profit sector. Among those that undoubtedly have a 2W leading role are foundations, especially those juridically hybrid organizations that are Italian bank foundations, but also company foundations which do philanthropy, and companies themselves. In Ferrera’s proposal an important role is entrusted to the company welfare, above all for its supposed virtue of creating positive externalities in the territories in which the companies are located. The scholar (Ferrera, 2013, 10) argues that “the development of company welfare can bring undoubted benefits: from reducing fiscal pressure on public budget to strengthening links between companies and territories, from employee loyalty to the co-promotion of a new mixed services economy of 2W, and of its virtuous circles, with positive effects also on the growth of GDP, on women's employment and more generally on gender equality”. Finally, in the opinion of other scholars, the company welfare could favor “functional recalibration”, opening up opportunities for new risks, through the development of new programs and interventions in underdeveloped sectors, such as training and work-life conciliation (Jessoula 2017; Agostini and Ascoli 2014)<sup>3</sup>.

## **The Generative Welfare Narrative**

The Zancan Onlus Foundation was established in 1964, in memory of a social worker, Emanuela Zancan, deputy director of the High School of Social Service of Padua, who left a legacy at the Social School. The sum was used for the realization of the Foundation, a study centre carrying out research in the area of social and health policies.

Between 2011 and 2012 the Zancan Foundation focused its attention on poverty, a phenomenon that in Italy changed form from transitory and conjunctural, to structural, with effects on social inequalities, on the fundamental rights of citizens. The economic crisis in 2008, with its heavy social consequences, has urged to rethink social policies.

The Foundation reads the Italian welfare as a model based almost exclusively on a state that collects and distributes resources through the tax system and monetary transfers that must be overcome. The

---

<sup>2</sup>Private welfare has been active before the welfare state. Without going back to the fragmented protection system implemented by crafts guilds and the Church in the free cities, it should be remembered that a conformation similar to the current mixed welfare system can also be found in XIX-XX centuries.

<sup>3</sup> For a critique of company welfare within the 2W, see Cataldi 2018.

Italian welfare system is characterised – according to the Foundation – by the prevalence of cash transfers over in-kind services such as professional interventions (Fondazione Zancan, 2014). Eligibility for the (prevailing) provision of cash transfers is based upon administrative data, rather than involving professional assessment of needs and capabilities. The Foundation argued that the current Italian welfare system does not generally empower beneficiaries, allowing them to be passive recipients of transfers and denying them the opportunity to give something in return to society for the support received.

In the opinion of Vecchiato, Director of Fondazione Zancan during 2012-2018, the Italian welfare must emancipate from a model based on the solidarity of a minority of solidarity (Vecchiato 2018). In this frame the third sector could have a priority role, in particular in activating the recipients. Vecchiato identifies “seven sores” (Vecchiato 2018) that affect the Italian system: 1) the subsidiarity concentrated in the third sector and intermediate bodies initiative is no longer enough to meet growing needs; 2) the decrease of non cash benefits and, on the other hand, the grow of unconditional cash transfer; 3) narrow for-profit companies involvement in social investment strategies; 4) regional - and local – inequalities in terms of access to welfare policies; 5) rights without duties; 6) impossibility to innovate with old professions; 7) processes of re-institutionalisation (Vecchiato 2018).

Given this scenario, the Fondazione Zancan explores a specific approach called “Generative welfare” (hereafter GW). It visualises a form of welfare which, after collecting fiscal resources and while redistributing them, becomes able to re-generate them through making users responsible for individual and social outcomes systematically. Such an approach was proposed in the national report on poverty and social exclusion (Fondazione Zancan, 2012) initially in 2012 and deepened in Report (Vecchiato 2013) in 2013. The leading idea is the assumption “I cannot help you without you”, which proposes the regeneration of resources to make them available to other people. It is argued that this would potentially allow the whole welfare system to become more effective in helping people, while creating a more cohesive society too.

The Zancan Foundation argues a welfare system that is able to regenerate resources is necessary, as well as empowered people increase the performance of social policy interventions for the benefit of the entire community. Even if not explicitly stated, the GW approach recalls the Third way proposed by Giddens (1998, 65), the assumption “no rights without responsibilities”.

According to Zancan the welfare state should move away from control and dependence of individuals; in doing so it is essential to recognise the responsibility of recipients. In other words, the GW paradigm is based on asking people (when possible) to return the support they received in favour of the community or other people in need (reciprocity).


Zancan account of GW include a critical approach to the Italian welfare model: «Moving away from a ‘deficit’ approach where the focus is on negatives such as deprivation, disorder and need, is advocated to adopting an approach which is ‘asset based’, seeking to build on the existing strengths of individuals and communities and their social and human resources, including motivation, capacity, networks and social capital (Canali *et al.* 2019, 31).

According to Zancan, the State, the Regions and the Municipalities carry out the task of promoting, regulating, monitoring and evaluating interventions. Implementing bodies are the subjects of the Third Sector, citizens in associated form, other non or for profit organisations.

“Collecting and redistributing”, for Zancan, the guiding ideas that inspired redistributive welfare are inadequate to respond to new social risks. It is necessary to abandon the logic of cost, preferring that of yield so that social policies no longer consume resources, but instead generate them. It is a question of passing from a welfare system that gathers and redistributes [ $W = f(r_1, r_2)$ ] to a welfare system that, in addition to collecting and redistributing, regenerates resources, making them return, thanks to

the responsibility linked to a new way of understanding social rights and duties [ $W = f(r1, r2, r3, r4, r5)$ ].

**Figure 2:** The 5R Model of GW



Source: Fondazione Zancan (2012; 2013)

The idea is to Re-Generate the resources, from policies that imply high costs for the society, to investment. Policies addressing “old risks”, such as unemployment benefits, minimum income provisions for the poor and old age pensions, may be partly redefined in criteria and structure and may be more tightly linked to activation measures. But – according to Saraceno (2013) - it is far from certain that this will reduce costs since activation policies are costly and the way they may reduce some social risks such as unemployment in a context of diminishing demand is not clear.

The generative welfare approach emphasises the role of the recipients and the “shift from individual rights towards ‘social rights’ with ‘collective return’, thanks to the contribution of each person’s capabilities, since the help received should also be return to other people in need” (Vecchiato 2015, 199).

Zancan is opposed to the aggressive individualism of neo-liberalism and wishes to repair damaged sympathies, to find new bases for solidarity: “The legal framework should therefore be redefined starting from the essential meaning of ‘social rights’, which non longer focus on individual benefits only, since they also aim to yield social returns” (Vecchiato 2015, 199).

The GW involves active participation rather than passive receipt, responsibilities and obligations as well as rights. The concept of responsibilities of beneficiaries identifies one of the main themes that have sustained the progressive change of paradigm in the welfare policies of most Western countries since the 1970s (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Ranci, Pavolini 2015). The (self)responsibility principle is central in the transition from the more traditional forms of social protection to policies inspired by the concept of social investment (van Kersbergen, Hemerijck 2012; Hemerijck 2015; Smyth, Deeming 2016) to wich also the Fondazione Zancan refers.

From GW point of view, responsabilisation is an inescapable assumption of a social justice system that is based on a dynamic of reciprocal assistance and sharing of related resources. This dimension of reciprocity serves, among other things, to limit the risk of establishing a condition of dependency between groups of individuals: more precisely, the dependence of the beneficiaries on those who deprive themselves of a part of their resources for support welfare interventions aimed at others.

Some critical scholars (Knijn *et al.* 2007) argue that the idea of responsabilisation hides a logic of social control concerning questions on the relationship between state and citizens. Indeed, the reflection on the theme of responsibilities calls into question the deservingness of welfare interventions. The basic question that supports this analysis frames the tensions between two of the

main assumptions of current welfare systems: freedom of choice in individual behavior and reciprocity in the construction of a wealth of resources for the community.

### **The New Welfare Society Narrative**

In 2015 Donati comes to formalize his proposal for a new welfare under the label of “(New) Welfare Society” (hereafter NWS) after a long course of research and analysis which led to the establishment of a school of “relational sociology”, of Catholic matrix, based in Italy, but also followed abroad (see *inter al.* Donati 1986, 1991, 2000, 2013).

The scholar starts from the idea that the welfare state, which represented the “dream of the modern state as a national eudaimonistic project” (Donati 2015, 2), faces an unprecedented and long term crisis, due not only to external challenges, but also to self-generated internal problems. The crisis of the welfare state is part of the crisis of modernity<sup>4</sup> and in particular of the “lib-lab” model, understood as a way to manage the postwar Western democratic societies which combine the opposing ideologies of liberalism and socialism through continuous research of negotiations and compromises between market and state or between freedom and equality.

In the opinion of the sociologist and philosopher, the lib/lab model applied to welfare has developed “a perverse synergy” having “the (unintentional?) effect of sustaining individual and collective behaviors unburdened of subjective responsibility” (Donati 2015, 5). In fact, the welfare state, instead of pursuing the common (and relational) good of the social well-being, has generated a fracture between what is ‘public’, “left to the great anonymous machine of social security which is ethically indifferent” and what is ‘private’, where a humanization of welfare services is undoubtedly sought. According to Donati the basic link between freedom and responsibility is missing and so the “civil society becomes un-civil” (*ibid.*) and the expression of a predominantly individual citizenship has expelled any ethical principle<sup>5</sup>.

A welfare based on “the exclusively binary model of market-plus-state” (*ibid.*, 4) – guided only by two logics: the state, which looks at the system integration by implementing processes of standardization and depersonalization; the market, which looks at the freedom in capitalism and consumerism terms<sup>6</sup> – is ultimately corrosive of the society itself (*ibid.*, 4-5), since it has “created a society of individuals and an increasing privatization of society under the protective guardianship of the Welfare State” (*ibid.*, 3).

---

<sup>4</sup>In Donati’s words (2015, 2) the welfare state “represents both the greatest political conquest and the structural limits of modernity”. The crisis of the modern society is revealed in all its gravity by the concept of reflexive modernization (Beck, Bonss, and Lau 2003) harshly criticized by the scholar as a defeatist and renouncing idea. The term after-modern (instead of post-modern) which accompanies and connotes the new society advocated by the sociologist is to remark not a radicalization but a clear discontinuity with modernity (*ibid.*, 3).

<sup>5</sup>Donati (2015) believes that even the modern welfare state, i.e. the current one in crisis, cannot work without choosing an ethical ideal, since social policies necessarily imply ethical choices. In his opinion, there are three paradigms that modernity has offered and continues to offer: the Mandevillian one, according to which private interests can not only co-exist with but even generate public virtues; the national one, inspired by the idea of a State-providence; and that one of a mandatory political solidarity based on free entitlements.

<sup>6</sup>Donati (2015, 11) is convinced that the “consumerism generates a broad range of problems or pathological conditions since consumption needs are artificially induced and technologies, especially the media, are misused”. For this reason, he hopes for the affirmation of a new social and economic ethic able to promote “an austere life-style” and “a different notion, relational and not merely materialistic, of well-being and happiness” (*ibid.*, 13).

The failure of the lib/lab model consists in combining “freedoms without control” (lib) and “redistributions without freedom” (lab) (*ibid.*, 9). Furthermore, “the lib/lab combination says almost nothing on social integration problems in contemporary societies”, it has “generated increasing integration deficits (the so-called ‘modernity pathologies’)” for which it provides no remedies (*ibid.*, 10).

Among the unexpected effects of what is defined as “a self-contradictory model, because it is the economy that drives morality and not viceversa” (*ibid.*, 11) there is “the globalization, marked by the economy’s financialization”: it is an expression of a Darwinian conception of society in which evolution is achieved through competition, but in the absence of a finalism (*ibid.*, 12). Finally, in Donati’s vision the current system, based on individualism, instrumentalism, utilitarianism and neo-functionalism would lead to the “commodification of the world” (*ibid.*, 11-12).

This severe judgement derives from a specific vision of society that also guides the scholar’s analysis. According to Donati, the societal system “is a complex interplay among four basic subsystems: the economic system, the political administrative system, the societal community (civil society) and the families with their informal networks” (*ibid.*, 3)<sup>7</sup>.

According to these coordinates, the major problems with respect to welfare are three: the ambiguous location of its apparatuses, “partially within the political-administrative system and partially outside of it”; the fact that these apparatuses have often been “confused with what they have called intermediate social formations (social private organizations, third sector, civil association)” (*ibid.*); the colonization of the “non political” (see Arendt 1958) by the state (in particular in Europe) and the market (in particular in the US). This colonization “impedes the emergence of a new ethic of well-being and adequate social institutions” and, specifically, the creation of an autonomous “social sphere” and the affirmation of “a truly Third Sector, symmetrical and or par with the other two spheres, the state and the market” (Donati 2015, 5).

The overcoming of the current welfare state does not foresee its dismantling but a complete redesign (*ibid.*, 3) in terms of relational welfare state. In NWS, defined as a “new configuration of welfare interventions at the community level”, “the relational state operates through relational inclusion, i.e. ways of co-producing welfare through relational networking among all stakeholders” (Donati 2015, abstract).

In the new scenario, the actors who produce the welfare are multiples (see table below), “the state is no longer the center and the vertex of the organization producing well-being”, and the well-being “is a matter of a pluralism of participation in the network of a “caring society” which is ruled on the basis of a post-socialist and post-liberal principle of subsidiarity” (*ibid.*, 6).

**Table 1:** Sectors that produce well-being and their relative indicators

INSTITUTIONS	State	Market	Civil Society	Families and Informal Networks
SECTORS	State Sector	Market Sector	Third Sector	Informal Sectors
Principle of coordination	Hierarchy (command)	competition	free will	personal obligation
Supply side collective actors	public administration	private enterprises	non-profit associations	families and networks of relatives, friends, and neighbors
Demand side entitled actors	Citizen	consumer	current or potential members of the associations	members of the community (familial, local, or personal)
Access regulation	right guaranteed upon legal request	Ability to pay	Sharing a need	ascription or acceptance

<sup>7</sup>Civil society, families and informal networks constitute the life-worlds, counterparts of the state-market complex.



Means of exchange	Law	money	influence	value commitment
Central value	Equality	freedom of choice	solidarity and (conditional) reciprocity	full (altruistic) reciprocity
Criterion of the good added	collective security	consumption of private goods	social and civic activities (production of secondary relational goods)	personal sharing (production of primary relational goods)
Primary flaw of each sector	carelessness concerning personal needs	inequality due to money	unequal distribution of goods and services, ineffective structures and poor management	limitations of the free choice due to moral obligations of the person in the family and primary networks

Source: Donati 2015 (small changes have been made)

Therefore, if the networks represent the most important organizational structure of relationship and (re)production of both the welfare and the society itself, the reciprocal subsidiarity, together with the solidarity, constitutes the basic principle. According to Donati, combining the subsidiarity with the principle of solidarity is a way “to overcome the defensive and restricted interpretation of subsidiarity as a “devolution” or “let people do things by themselves”, enforcing “an active and promotional interpretation of subsidiarity as ‘a way to help people to do what they have to do’”(ibid., 19).

The NWS is based on “a new mutualist principle” and “regulates itself by maximizing social autonomy which cooperatively devises the rules used to determine universally binding decision” (ibid., 8). In this sense, the new society contrasts competition with cooperation and state monopoly with shared government: the relational state is grounded on the co-responsibility between public and private sectors, between the state and civil society (ibid., 19). The key adjectives of the NWS are three: shared, associational and, indeed, relational (ibid., 18).

The politics itself become “a more widespread function”, no longer monopoly of the state, since “every sector and every actor has and makes his own politics of welfare” (ibid., 6). Even the ethics, like the politics, is characterized by decentralization and diffuse nature, even if “it is necessary to have orienting common values which are drawn from universal principle, beyond the single and particular loyalties, associations, and attributive characteristic of individuals” (ibid.). In fact, the co-ownership and the co-exercise of politics and ethics in a universalist perspective is indispensable so that “the person can act in personalized spheres where is possible to have a societal community” (ibid.).

The idea of citizenship also goes through a profound process of expansion and revision: the new relational welfare should be based on an after-modern citizenship which implies the transition from a state citizenship to a social citizenship (ibid., 7). In open controversy with the widespread occupational imprinting of the traditional welfare, in after-modern society the citizen is a person and not a worker (ibid., 8). The task of extending citizenship through relational inclusion, as a strategy for reaching the after-modern society, does not belong only to the state, but to each social actor and sphere (ibid., 9)<sup>8</sup>. In Donati's conception, the relational citizenship has to overcome the challenge of interconnecting “the rights stemming from ‘above’ (state citizenship) with the rights stemming from ‘below’ (societal citizenship), so to promote the flourishing of differentiated and multiple forms of citizenship” (ibid., 19-20). Moreover, in the future society, citizenship must be conferred only to individuals/persons but to the intermediary social formations of civil society: only in this way is it possible to realize an associational democracy generating relational goods (ibid., 20).

<sup>8</sup>The after modern symbolic code of relationality (et ... et) is opposed to the modern (lib/lab) code of inclusion/exclusion (aut..aut), since people is included not on the basis of state citizenship, but of societal citizenship, that is on the basis of reciprocity and respect for legitimate differences (ibid., 8-9).

It is important to note that in this revolution of the concepts of citizenship and society the local dimension is fundamental: it gives substance to the networks and realizes the relational citizenship (*ibid.*, 19). The local dimension is also the first and most important field of innovation (*ibid.*, abstract). In the new arrangement, the Third Sector plays a leading role: it does not represent only the “alternative to the market underpinning the lib/lab set up”, but “operates as an engine of a civil society” and it is the beating heart of the relational system (*ibid.*, 14)<sup>9</sup>. However a significant space is also assigned to the “new enterprises, as low profit limited liability companies and community interest companies” (*ibid.*), able to embody the principle according to which “economic freedom must have a social responsibility” towards the whole society (*ibid.*, 9)<sup>10</sup>, as well as to animate new financial markets (*ibid.*, 14).

In fact, the NWS requires a radical change in the economic logic that operates in it. Alongside, the extension of citizenship, is able to transform the society into an after modern society, indeed is “putting more ethics into the market”. The new society has to be inspired by “the ethical criterion of sustainability” (*ibid.*, 15), which primarily means that the tools (money, finance, technology) are, and must remain, means and not turn into self-standing ends or goals (money must not only provide more money as it happens in modern society), since the ultimate goal is to satisfy human, material and - above all - relational needs (*ibid.*).

Finally, Donati hopes for a model of social development which “reinforces the best aspects of system and social integration at the same time”, thus aiming at the synergy between state and civil society, in particular the Third Sector. To conclude, based on the picture shown, it is not a mistake to infer that for the scholar the latter is the privileged place and instrument of expression of the “relational logic of social innovation that can produce solid social relations and reinforce reciprocal human capacities: a true Third Sector is the antidote to “nullifying, weakening, or right the relation of welfare” (*ibid.*).

## **The Civil Welfare Narrative**

The economist Zamagni comes to formulate his proposal of new welfare in substantial continuity with his previous works, which focused on the study of the non-profit/Third Sector (Zamagni 1998, 2002) and on the development of the concept of ‘civil economy’ (Bruni and Zamagni 2004, 2015)<sup>11</sup>, as an anti-capitalist paradigm, oriented to the common good (Zamagni 2007) and based on reciprocity and fraternity. The values advocated in his writings and his speeches, as well as the same relations with Città Nuova publishing house, clearly reveal his identity as a “progressive” Catholic<sup>12</sup>. Also significant are the positions he held: former president of the Third Sector Agency and current president of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

---

<sup>9</sup>These are the sentences that allow us to understand which third sector subjects Donati refers to (2015): “big and small charities, social cooperatives, non-profit agencies, and the companies working in the field of civil economy” (*ibid.*, 19); and, more in detail, “the vast world of co-operation (social co-operation, social enterprises), of voluntary associations, of ethical banks and of various forms of microcredit, of fair trade, of NGOs, of multiple forms of enterprises which we call ‘civil’”. The task of all social spheres, but even more of the Third sector, is not only that one of relational inclusion, but of redistribution (*ibid.*, 19).

<sup>10</sup>Companies also have the duty of internal social responsibility, towards their employees. It takes the form of company welfare.

<sup>11</sup>The first book by Bruni and Zamagni (2004) has been translated into Spanish, English, Portuguese, German and Korean.

<sup>12</sup>Città Nuova is the publishing house linked to the Focolare Movement (Movimento dei Focolari), a Catholic movement with a social vocation spread all over the world and open to interreligious dialogue and with atheists.

Zamagni (2015a, 2015b) constructs his idea of Civil Welfare (CW hereafter) starting from the illustration of the reasons for the crisis of the US model of welfare capitalism and European welfare state. About the latter, he begins by saying that we are facing a crisis of the model and not of the values that inspired it and that led to its development starting from the second post-war period. Indeed, he explicitly recognizes that “the achievements of the social state represent one of the highest manifestations of democratic progress for Western civilization” (Zamagni 2015a, 3). Moreover, he points out that the redistribution of both goods (or services) and powers contributing to strengthening democracy in Western Europe stands out of the remarkable merits of the welfare state (*ibid.*, 7).

According to the scholar, the reason for the welfare state crisis that occurred in the last quarter of the last century (*ibid.*, 7) would not be traceable in the fiscal crisis, but rather in the inability to conjugate, in a sustainable way, equity (pay attention: not equality) and freedom, in particular facing social risks profoundly changed due to the shift from the Fordist to the post-Fordist era (*ibid.*, 3).

With respect to risks, the author’s insistence is on the fact that they were (or, better, they were perceived) as exogenous, while now they are (or, better, they are recognized as) endogenous, that is “attributable to the very way in which the society itself organizes and, above all, the way in which the sphere of the production of wealth is articulated”, that is - it is not a case! - the economy (*ibid.*).

An example of what endogenous risks mean is provided by health protection: there is increasing awareness that diseases such as tumors are linked to environmental factors and lifestyles. For this reason the response of the welfare state has also changed (and should increasingly change): from a specifically therapeutic approach to a preventive and health promotional approach (*ibid.*, 3-4).

Changes such as these show that even modalities of action of the traditional welfare state that are increasingly being strengthened, such as resorting to state programs of transfer payment (Lindbeck 2008), are no longer an answer, since they also favour the emergence of distorting effects not so much among the rich and poor, but within the middle and upper middle classes, resulting in a conflict “certainly not compatible with the demands of stability in an advanced democracy” (*ibid.*, 4). Moreover, even the other mode of action of the welfare state, i.e. in-kind services, presents serious sustainability problems “when the risk matrix becomes internal”.<sup>13</sup>

Zamagni (2015b) argues that the current welfare state has a double Achilles heel: first, financial sustainability; second, bureaucratization. The problem of financial sustainability is that “welfare services, if they want to be quality, keeping pace with scientific and technological progress, have rising costs” (*ibid.*, 7). The main source the state has at its disposal to support these costs is general taxation, but it is unthinkable to increase it in proportion to the cost coverage because “the ever increasing tax burden would end up jeopardizing the democratic structure of the country” (*ibid.*, 7-8). Moreover, even the fight against waste and tax evasion would not be sufficient to guarantee a real financial balance, even if they represent necessary strategies. Finally it is necessary to bear in mind that, apart from corruption and malpractice dynamics, the bureaucratic-administrative apparatus has a significant impact on money transfers: “for every 100 euros destined to finance welfare services only 70 euros, on average, reach those in need”, so that a prudent estimate of the bureaucratic machine's weight is about 30% (*ibid.*, 8). This consideration leads directly to the second Achilles heel: bureaucratization, understood according to the technical canons of the theory of organization, that is as “standardization of the ways of satisfying needs”, i.e. process standardization (*ibid.*). On this issue, Zamagni shows off the entire theoretical repertoire about the criticism of the Weberian or traditional bureaucracy, as well as about the specificity of human services: from the observation that human needs cannot be standardized derives the condemnation to the impersonality of administrative action and the need to encourage the personalization of services; from the relational specificity of the

---

<sup>13</sup>This is undoubtedly the case of public long term care. Zamagni does not use this example, but in our opinion it helps to clarify the issue.

service-good derives the non-verifiability of the quality of welfare services, which implicitly refers to the indispensability of a democratic empowerment of users, as well as to citizen-satisfaction as a tool for a reflective evaluation of public administration and services, in opposition to a (too often only quantitative) performance assessment<sup>14</sup>.

However, Zamagni's critique of the traditional set-up goes beyond these issues, because it comes to use the term “aporie” (with reference to the double Achilles heel) (*ibid.*, 10) and to challenge the same contractual foundation of the welfare state. This is the reconstruction of the argument used against contractual theories (*ibid.*, 9): at the basis of the idea of a contract, private or social, there is the notion of negotiability, which in itself presupposes the ability of the parties and individuals to negotiate; however, this capacity is not at all obvious and is not equally distributed among individuals and in society; – then Zamagni asks – “what about those who are not independent or autonomous, because for example disabled, are not able to negotiate and therefore to sign the social contract?” (*ibid.*), is it acceptable that for this reason they are excluded not only from the services but from the society itself?<sup>15</sup>

The negative answer is immediate and resolute, despite, for mere rhetorical artifice, it is not expressed in first person, but is contained in the “objection that a supporter of fundamental human rights could in this regard advance”: “even the ‘outcasts’ have inviolable rights as persons” (*ibid.*).

The conception of the citizen-person, enriched by a relational foundation, is opposed to the liberal and individualistic one that we could define as the “citizen-by-contract”. Indeed, Zamagni argues that “what unites the multiple versions of liberalism - the dominant current of contemporary political thought - is the idea that the category of human rights can be considered independently from the relationships that bind individuals living together in society” (*ibid.*, 9-10, adding that the individualistic conception of rights is harshly criticized “because it fails to take into account the basically social character of individual rights” (*ibid.* 10).

To conclude the *destruens* part, i.e. the criticism, of the traditional mode of production of the well-being, Zamagni (2015a, 5) states that, at the root of the failure of the welfare state, there is a false premise that could be summarized in the slogan “let's make the biggest cake and then let's share it with justice”. This slogan highlights the division of roles between the capitalist market and the state: the first has the task of producing as much wealth as possible, because “business is business” and “competition is competition”, without any ethical consideration on the way in which wealth is produced; the second one has the task of redistributing it according to some criterion of equity. Therefore, the paradox of the welfare state is “implicitly accepting that the capitalist market fully follows its logic, except then intervening *post-factum*, with *ad hoc* state interventions, to mitigate its perverse effects”: an attempt to correct side effects is made, but woe to touch the system that generated them (*ibid.*).

Moving on to the *construens* part, in the CW “it is the whole society, and not the state, which must take charge of the well-being of those who live in it” (Zamagni 2015b, 10). Therefore, in Zamagni (*ibid.*) we can properly speak about a caring society (see Glenn 2000): “it is society as a whole that must take care of all those who live in it without any exclusion”<sup>16</sup>. In order for this to happen, it is necessary to “link up the three spheres of which each society is composed: the sphere of public bodies (state, regions, municipalities, parastatals, etc.), the sphere of companies, or the business community,

---

<sup>14</sup>On the differences, but also on the points of contact and the possible short circuits, between the consumerist approach and the democratic approach to users in welfare services, see Cataldi (2015).

<sup>15</sup>For contractual theories, all rights, and therefore citizenship, originate in the social pact.

<sup>16</sup>The universalism of rights and benefits is a key point of Zamagni's proposal. For a discussion of the reasons supporting universalism in the health sector, see Zamagni (2005).

and the sphere of organized civil society (associations of various kinds, social cooperatives, non-governmental organizations, foundations)” (*ibid.*).

If the principle of the welfare state is redistribution, the principle of the new welfare is circular subsidiarity (Zamagni 1991). The concept of circular subsidiarity has an ancient origin: it is taken from St. Bonaventure, a theologian known to be the biographer of St. Francis (Folena 2017); was developed by civil Humanism (XV); and, subsequently, it was formalized by the jurist Ugo Grozio and the philosopher Althusius (Zamagni 2015b, 11). According to Zamagni, the idea that the state, market and civil society should cooperate (which is more than collaborating), avoiding one prevailing over the other, has an Aristotelian foundation, but is more directly inspired by St. Bonaventure. Indeed, in the thirteenth century the professor of the Sorbonne taught that the prince, the merchants and the brotherhoods had to constantly dialogue with each other with three objectives: to define priorities, find resources and study management methods. In summary he prefigured what is now called governance.

The adjective “circular” refers to the fact that the three spheres, the one of public institutions, the business community, and the organized civil society, “must decide and implement ways of systematic interaction based on pre-defined protocols” (Zamagni 2015b, 10), i.e. “partnership protocols for planning and managing interventions” (Zamagni 2015a, 8). The economist specifies that circular subsidiarity markedly differs from vertical and horizontal and it is not, as one might think, the result of the integration of the two: in circular subsidiarity there is no cession, but sharing of sovereignty (*ibid.*; Zamagni 2015b, 11). Therefore, the slogan is no longer “the State does not do what the lower institutions and civil society subjects can do”, but “make the State together with business companies and non-profit organizations” (*ibid.* and *ibid.*).

As a closing observation with respect to circular subsidiarity, it should be noted that the CW rather than being based on a generic governance model is based on what Brandsen and Pestoff (2008) define as “co-governance”, since there is co-production in all phases of the production cycle of welfare services: planning, delivery and evaluation (Zamagni 2015b, 17; see also Cataldi 2015). Exactly the principle of co-production between spheres and stakeholders leads Zamagni to explicitly recognize that his proposal is fully inscribed in the New Governance Model, or - better - in the narrative of New Public Governance (Osborne 2006).

In addition to circular subsidiarity, in CW there are three other principles.

The first, already mentioned, is the universalism of welfare benefits. In favor of this principle there are not only ethical reasons, but problems well known to public choice: Zamagni (2005) not only mentions Buchanan (1997) to highlight how a welfare system that discriminates between social groups ends up eroding society's consent to the political system, but also the well-known problems of information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection. If the first two are still unresolved problems, universalism is the solution for the last (Zamagni 2015b, 13). Finally, selective welfare requires setting eligibility criteria that are always very problematic in terms of social justice.

The second principle is that of the centrality of the person. First of all, this principle requires a shift of focus: in CW attention must be not on needs, but on the person who has them. This implies that “needs of persons cannot be satisfied anonymously, regardless of their preferences and the plot of the relationships that bind together demand and offer subjects” (*ibid.*, 14). Another fundamental value is the respect for the autonomy of the person, which makes “the participation of individuals in defining the conditions of satisfaction of their needs” (*ibid.*) not only desirable but necessary. This value represents a bulwark against “the welfarist paternalism” (*ibid.*, 4) whose severe condemnation Zamagni shares with the generative welfare (Vecchiato 2013). The attention to the person and to the quality of the relationship are orienting values that enter into open controversy with the dominant

administrative models, primarily New public management and consumerism, criticized for their utilitarian matrix (Zamagni 2015b, 14 and 17).

Finally, the third principle is the orientation to the common good. The distinctive feature of the CW is precisely that of “thinking of welfare as a special case of the common good - like water, air, climate, fertility of the earth, biodiversity, knowledge, culture, etc.” (*ibid.*, 17). Here the intellectual references are multiple and mixed: Aristotle, Arendt, E. Ostrom. Leaning on the classics Zamagni (2015b, 15) states that: “the common good is a logic that does not allow substitutability (i.e. trade-off)”; in the common good “everyone's good cannot be enjoyed if it is not also enjoyed by the others”; the common good is distinguished both from the private good and from the public good, because in the common good “everyone's interest is realized *together* with that of the others, not *against* (as it happens with the private good), nor *regardless* of the interest of the others (as it happens with the public good); and - finally - that “common is the place of what does not belong only to yourself, and this is the place of interpersonal relationships”. Especially in relation to this last statement, we understand in what sense “the friend of the common good” is “the behavior inspired by the principle of reciprocity” (*ibid.*). This principle substantively differs from that of pure exchange, since the latter presupposes the equivalence between giving and receiving (but also the irreplaceable nature of the giver and the receiver), while reciprocity postulates proportionality (and the opening of the subjects who can give and receive): “I freely give you something so that you in turn can give, according to your abilities, to others or possibly to me” (*ibid.*, 15-16).

Although no sphere should prevail over the other, it is important to highlight that the CW's leading player is the Third sector, as an organized part of the civil society. Indeed, civil society organizations would occupy “a special place in circular subsidiarity, as they would bring both specific knowledge and ways of governance capable of raising the relational quality of the services provided” (*ibid.*, 10). Zamagni seems to show a specific interest in the world of cooperatives, in addition to that in the voluntary sector. He claims that “in the current historical conditions, the type of community-based management that is most usable is a cooperative type”, also because “it pays the necessary attention to the demand side of the common good” (*ibid.*, 18), allowing greater personalization of the services provided.

However, it is equally important to point out that Zamagni proposes a solution to overcome the aporias of the current system that also brings into play the most properly private actors: he proposes to “draw on the resources coming from the business world to channel them towards the provision of welfare services” (*ibid.*, 10)<sup>17</sup>.

In his conclusions that invite us to reflect on how it is possible to overcome the current stalemate of welfare, also inextricably linked to the crisis of politics and representation. Zamagni (*ibid.*, 19) explains that the transition from the welfare state to the civil welfare postulates that we move from the “public and private” binomial to the “public, private, and civil” trinomial, because the modern distinction between public and private “no longer grasps reality”. There are two reasons: first, the private-state binomial “leaves out important segments of society”; second, the spheres of “public” and “private” have not only hybridized, but even merged<sup>18</sup>. Finally, it is worthwhile to quote a caveat that is very important to the scholar and which seems to anticipate possible criticisms of his proposal: to de-statize does not necessarily mean privatizing, but socializing. Indeed, an essential function of the state, understood as a set of public bodies, remains, as Zamagni writes (*ibid.*, 10): “in this model the presence of the public authority remains fundamental in order to guarantee universalism, because the danger of the exclusion of certain social groups from the use of services must always be kept in

---

<sup>17</sup>This solution is largely coincident with that of Ferrera's 2W.

<sup>18</sup>Zamagni (2015b, 19) uses the term “public and private conflation”, caused – in particular – by the (negative) externalities of the private, which have public repercussions.

mind”. Therefore, this is the sense in which we have to read the invitation to overcome “the erroneous conception that identifies the sphere of the public with that of the state” (*ibid.*, 4): public is not statal, but social, or - even better - (actually only, civic and organized) civil (society).


### An attempt to syntetise: coordinates, common elements, and differences

The welfare narratives here presented have important points in common: 1) they all advocate to overcome the current welfare state; 2) they impute the need for such overcoming for sustainability reasons; 3) they postulate a plural and pluralist welfare; 4) they share a participatory/co-productive turn: welfare is participated and co-produced by multiple actors; 5) they propose to de-statize the welfare, to a greater or lesser extent; 6) in all of them there is a change in the concept of citizen and citizenship that goes in the direction of the citizen responsabilization; 7) they suggest the network governance model as governing method; 8) they highlight the importance of the territorial and local dimension; 8) they promote the centrality of the person as a fundamental value.

However, the new welfare narratives also show significant differences. In this paragraph we will discuss both similarities and differences.

Regarding the first point, the coordinates to understand the question of the overcoming of the current welfare set-up by the four narratives presented are provided by the four types of “welfare discourses” by Baldock and Ungerson (1996). The types - identified by the intersection of two dimensions, the low-high participation and the individual-collective action of the users - are: welfarism, consumerism, privatism, clientalism (see figure 2 below).

**Figure 1:** the four welfare discourses based on modes of participation



Source: Baldolck and Ungerson (1996, 29)

The typology of Baldock and Ungerson (1994) has two advantages: first, it highlights the way welfare arrangements, as well as well-being services and policies, depend on the definition and the approach of citizen-users to a large extent; second, it highlights - in welfare discourses – the way individualism-collectivism refers to two rhetorical dimensions in tension.

The four narratives propose an overcoming of all four modes of participation in the welfare system (*ibid.*). On the one hand (on the right side of figure 2), they criticize the ‘welfarism-clientelism’ couple, on the other hand (on the left side of figure 2) they criticize the ‘consumerism-privatism’ couple.

Welfarism is based on the belief of users in the welfare state and on their right to use it. Here the defense mechanism of users' own entitlement is crucial. In this sense, this discourse is, to a certain extent, characterized by a welfare dependency mentality.

In the opposite discourse, i.e. the consumerist one, users have no expectations in the state and, conversely, they adhere to a vision of individual self-sufficiency.

Privatism is similar to consumerism, but it has a substantive difference: it is more passive. In this discursive model, users are not able to activate themselves at a collective level and refuse state intervention, more because they want to avoid the stigma of dependence rather than because they trust their capacity for autonomous action.

Finally, clientelism is the most passive discourse of all: it configures a situation of collective dependence and the approach to welfare is "passive, accepting, patient and grateful" (*ibid.*, 32).

From the description of the types it should be clear why the criticism is, so to speak, couple to couple: in Baldock and Ungerson (1994), clientelism and privatism appear as degenerations, or – better – failures of the collective mobilization ideals, of welfarism, in the first case, and consumerism, in the second one.

Other coordinates, which contribute to making even clearer how the four narratives stand outside the framework of traditional welfare discourses and intend to pursue a new direction, are provided by the five approaches to user involvement in European welfare services by Evers (2006): welfarism, professionalism, consumerism, managerialism, participationalism.

The main line of conflict is that one which contrasts the welfarism-professionalism couple to the consumerism-managerialism one, while the direction for the development of a new welfare is represented by participationalism.

If the two typologies (Baldock and Ungerson 1996 and Evers 2006) are combined, their explanatory power increases considerably. The creation of a single typology in which the triplet welfarism-professionalism-clientelism opposes the triplet consumerism-managerialism-privatism, is made possible because in Evers (2006) professionalism and managerialism represent ideologies instrumental to the realization, respectively, of welfarism and consumerism.

The first polemical target of the new welfare narratives is undoubtedly represented by the first triplet. In this case, the criticisms that have the strongest tones and which are mutually reinforcing are those against the "welfarist paternalism" by Zamagni (2015b, 4) and those that loudly call for "the right to freedom from dependence on welfare, as well as from the help that does not recognize dignity and capacity/ability" by the GW (Vecchiato 2013, 2). The position of the economist Zamagni is undoubtedly evidence of a participationist turn, when he, recalling Keynes (1939), states that in a welfare system it is important to accompany the protection with "forms of participation of individuals in defining the conditions of satisfaction of their needs" (Zamagni 2015b, 14).

The second triplet is also harshly criticized. In this case, Zamagni and Donati are the ones who reinforce each other. In Donati (2015) consumerism is a radical expression of the (anti-ethical) dominance of the capitalist economic logic in the lib-lab model<sup>19</sup>. Consumerism is harshly criticized for its neo-functionalist, instrumental and utilitarian matrix (*ibid.* 11-12). Zamagni (2015b, 14 and 17) also formulates an anti-utilitarian critique of consumerism and its instrumental ideology, managerialism. Furthermore, in the words of criticism that Zamagni addresses to the New public management we find the famous controversy against managerialism in human services, such as that formulated by Tsui and Cheung (2004), especially with regard to the criticism of standardization and

---

<sup>19</sup> It is interesting to note that in Donati (2015) the condemnation is not so much aimed at consumerism as a theoretical approach, but at consumerism as a consumption practice. The meaning of consumerism that is the object of criticism is the one in vogue in the 1980s that recalls lifestyles based on a futile and voluptuous consumption, like the purchase of designer clothes.



obsession for quantitative evaluation (see also Cataldi e Tousijn 2015).

The second point of the elements that represent the common denominator of the new welfare narratives requires a shorter discussion. As anticipated, all the welfare discourses presented identify sustainability as the main reason why the welfare state must be modified: welfare as we know it is no longer sustainable.

However, the reasons why a sustainability problem arises are only partially shared. All scholars admit that there is a problem of financial sustainability in the face of growing needs and, even more, in the contingency of the 2008 economic crisis, as Ferrera tells us more clearly than the others, but for three of the four discourses the problem of sustainability is not just financial, but above all it is an ethical and value problem. This is certainly true for the GW, for which “individual rights that do not correspond to duties of solidarity” are not acceptable (Vecchiato 2013, 2), but also for Donati (2015), who denounces the expulsion of the ethical dimension from the lib/lab model and from the welfare, as well as for Zamagni (2015a; 2015b). The latter even denies that the financial crisis is the first cause of the welfare crisis<sup>20</sup>, except then indicating it as one of the two aporias of the current system.

The sustainability issue highlights an aspect that the reader will already have abundantly perceived: one of the major differences between the new welfare discourses is that NWS, CW, and GW have a strong ethical and value mark (this aspect is not surprising given the, more or less explicit, Catholic matrix underlying them); while 2W tries to be as ethically neutral as possible, in line with the liberal precepts of secularity for public space, much criticized by Donati.

Point three highlights how all four welfare narratives are largely attributable to the new administrative and governance model defined by the New Public Governance label (Osborne 2006). Indeed, although this element is explicitly recognized only by Zamagni (2015b), all the main characteristics that outline this model can be found in them (see table 2 below).

**Table 1:** Elements of New Public Governance, in contrast to Traditional Public Administration, and New Public Management

ELEMENTS	TPA	NPM	NPG
Theoretical roots	Political Science Public policy Public Administration	Managerialism Public Choice	Organizational Sociology Network Theory
Nature of the state/system	unitary	Divisionalized	plural and pluralist
Structures and forms of organizing	unitary bureaucracies	(quasi) competitive markets	collaborative networks
Focus	policy system	intra-organizational management	inter-organizational governance
Governance mechanism	hierarchy	market and contracts	trust or relational contracts
Key performance aspects	compliance with rules and regulations	efficiency customer satisfaction	effectiveness citizen satisfaction
Core values	public sector ethos professionalism	competition managerialism	collaboration cooperation integration public value new ethos of public service new professionalism
Conception of citizens	constituents/tax payers	customers/consumers	co-producers

Source: Cataldi (2018 – simplified version)

<sup>20</sup> In Zamagni’s opinion (20015b, 3) the first cause of the welfare crisis is a value problem that consists in the inability to conjugate, in a sustainable way, equity and freedom.

In particular, all the discourses postulate a plural welfare, that is constituted by a plurality of actors, and pluralist, that is constructed through different processes, logic and dynamics (see Osborne 2006, 384).

However, there are some differences between narratives on both the actors and the dynamics. The first aspect to vary is the number of actors. In Ferrera's 2W and in Donati's NWS there are four actors (spheres) which correspond to the points of the so-called welfare diamond (Ferrera 2006): state, market (companies), third sector (civil society), families (and informal networks). In the GW all the four players are recalled (Fondazione Zancan 2015). Unlike the others, in Zamagni (2015a; 215b) there are three actors, because curiously families are not mentioned, although they are at the subject of various publications as first-level producers of the common good and first recipients of welfare (see *inter al.* Zamagni and Zamagni 2012).

Another difference between narratives lies in the role and the importance of the different actors: first and foremost, of the state, but also of the third sector actors and companies. We will talk about the state in another point, the one concerning the de-statization, while we will talk here about the third sector and the companies. All four rhetorical constructions assign a fundamental role to the third sector, as an expression of the intermediate bodies of the society (Maino and Ferrera 2013; Donati 2015), an organized component of civil society (Zamagni 2015b), as well as the engine of the same and of the welfare (Donati 2015). However, the real actors of the Third Sector, defined by Kendall and Knapp (1995) as "loose and baggy monster", change a lot. In 2W a leading role is assigned to "strong actors" such as foundations, particularly bank foundations, while the cooperatives remain in the background. The explanation is simple: the cooperatives, as service providers, are the great protagonists of the first welfare. In the GW, the Third Sector actors are all important without many distinctions, even if Vecchiato repeatedly reiterates the concept that intermediate bodies can no longer cope alone with growing well-being needs. In Donati (2015) and Zamagni (2015b) both the voluntary sector and the cooperatives play an important role. However, particular attention is paid to the latter, by virtue of their economic role and their ability to customize services. Moreover, with regard to the world of cooperatives, both scholars hope for necessary reform and innovation paths, aimed on the one hand at separating the sheep from the goats and strengthening the role of the third sector. Finally, with reference to the business community, Vecchiato (2013, 7) cites the world of profit among the entrepreneurs of the new WG project; Zamagni (2015b) and Ferrera (*inter. al.* 2013) share the idea that welfare resources can be drained from companies; and Donati, like Ferrera, pays attention to corporate welfare<sup>21</sup>.

To conclude with respect to point three, a difference between narratives must also be highlighted in the dynamics underlying welfare pluralism. Indeed, only Zamagni (2015b) distinguishes between collaboration and cooperation, while the others make no distinction. The point deserves further study and is linked – as we will see later - to the role and the relationship between the other actors and the state, as well as to the relationship between public offer and private offer of welfare services. Following Zamagni when he says that cooperating is more than collaborating, it could be argued that the difference between the two dynamics lies in the division of labor necessary to pursue a common goal: cooperation requires a higher division of labor, i.e. a more complex organization than collaboration. In other words, cooperation requires a more guided coordination than collaboration which, in theory, can rely on an almost spontaneous coordination. Another distinction could lie in the common goal: in collaboration it can be, so to speak, incidental (realized by convergence of interests

---

<sup>21</sup> In Donati, the company welfare is an expression of social responsibility in the economic world, while in Ferrera the reflection on company welfare is more articulated and it bets on positive externalities at the level of territorial community.

between different actors and networks), while in cooperation it has to be set *a priori*.

At this point, it should be clear that the presence of a subject capable of imposing itself on others is necessary to achieve such coordination and to set a common goal. In this sense, it is plausible that full cooperation, unlike collaboration, requires the presence of and the coordination by the state. The conclusions of this reasoning will be drawn in the section on de-statization. Here, it is sufficient to say that some welfare narratives envisage properly cooperative dynamics, while others envisage collaborative dynamics, based on the autonomy of actors and networks.

With regards to the fourth point, we need to focus on two elements: first, the literature on policy participation has distinct origins from that on co-production; second, all the welfare narratives share elements attributable to both participation and co-production, but no author explicitly refers to these two literature streams, with exception of Zamagni (2015b). The literature on co-production has been formalized before that one on policy participation. The latter flourished with the first theories of governance in the 1990s, while the concept of co-production was originally developed at the University of Indiana, receiving a lot of interest from public policy and public administration scholars in the 1970s and 1980s (*inter al.* see Ostrom 1996; Whitaker 1980; Sharp 1980; Kiser and Percy 1980; Brudney and England 1983). This concept has been rediscovered and brought to the fore by the New Public Governance (see table 2). It is worth mentioning here, at least, two of the reasons that led to this rediscovery: first, co-production – unlike policy participation, which often favours the “high” phases of the policy cycle – focuses on the output side, recalling the attention to the implementation; second, (re)thinking governance in the light of the concept of co-production, puts the knot of participation productivity at the center of the analysis (Cataldi 2015). Zamagni (2015b), in line with this approach, recognizes both the centrality of the concept of co-production and the fact that the CW belongs to New Public Governance.

Co-production takes us directly to the fifth point: de-statization. Here, the term de-statization, borrowed from Zamagni (2015b), simply indicates the process that leads to having less state intervention. According to this view, there is de-statization in all welfare narratives analysed here. However, two significant differences emerge: on one hand, about the concrete meaning of de-statization, i.e. the role assigned to the state in welfare governance; on the other, about the judgment on de-statization.

Reading the paragraphs presenting the new welfare narratives makes it clear that in all four proposals the state changes its role and loses its role of absolute pre-eminence. However, the change proposed by the authors varies greatly in intensity and substance. Donati does not explicitly acknowledge any superordinate status to the state, so the state seems almost an actor among others. In 2W, the state maintains its supra-ordered role, since it is recognized as the “container” of all well-being production processes and, above all, is the “sovereign regulator” of these processes (Maino 2013, 26). In CW, such as in GW, the process is more nuanced: Zamagni (2015b) and Vecchiato (Fondazione Zancan 2015) do not recognize the state as a strictly superordinate role compared to civil society, but they recognize a pre-eminence of the state as a guarantor of welfare universalism.

Returning to the question of the dynamics of new welfare systems, it is clear that in 2W the state presides the organization of work to pursue a common goal which the state itself guarantees. In 2W we are – at least theoretically – in a context closer to full cooperation; while in the NWS, we are in a context closer to a collaborative structure, since the actor who has to take charge of the coordination of the parts, i.e. the state, seems to be absent. If we take into consideration what Zamagni says about the will to create a cooperative rather than a collaborative structure, we have to admit that the role of the state in the CW is more important than he wants to make it appear. The judgment on de-statization to a large extent reflects what has just been said. Donati (2015) and Vecchiato (2013) hope for de-statization, since they seem to interpret it in terms of social reappropriation of welfare. Ferrera (2017,

7) indirectly tells us that de-statization is “what we observe (and not necessarily what we would like to happen)” “in a context of permanent austerity”. Zamagni (2015b, 10) takes care to tell us that de-statizing is a positive thing if it means socializing (as in Donati's meaning) and not privatizing.

The term “social re-appropriation of welfare” is not chosen by chance: the narrative of Catholic matrix keeps remembering the civil (i.e. private, we would say more prosaically) origin of welfare. On the contrary, Ferrera tries to conceal this trait of continuity starting from the very name of his proposal. On the contrary, Ferrera tries to conceal this trait of continuity starting from the very name of his proposal. He makes no secret of still believing that the welfare state is the best possible world. However, given that public welfare as we know it is unsustainable, he invites us to adapt (if possible with positivity and optimism) to the idea of a new welfare system, the 2W precisely, fueled largely by private resources: a similar adjustment – he argues – is necessary, otherwise the survival of the welfare state itself will be at risk.

As regards the sixth point, in all four rhetorical constructions a change of perspective can be found with respect to the concepts of citizen and citizenship. Simplifying, we could say that in all the narratives we can identify a shift from what we could call a “marshallian citizen” to an “Athenian citizen” (Powell *et al.* 2009), as well as from citizenship of entitlement to a citizenship of contribution (see Cataldi 2015), i.e. from a more passive citizen to a more active citizen, and from a citizenship based on the claim and defense of acquired rights to a citizenship also based on the duty (and right) to co-produce the society e its well-being.

This double passage focuses, on one hand, on the productivity of participation (*ibid.*), as we have said, on the other, on the responsabilization of the recipient.

As O'Malley explains (2009, 277), “‘responsibilization’ is a term developed in the governmentality literature to refer to the process whereby subjects are made individually responsible for a task which previously would have been the duty of another – usually a state agency – or would not have been recognized as a responsibility at all”. Thus, it is “a process in which government ‘passed back’ these responsibilities to individuals and communities”, and frequently it “is illustrated by such slogans as ‘no rights without obligations’” (*ibid.*). Undoubtedly, many scholars believe that responsabilization “is strongly associated with neo-liberal political discourses, when managed by an expert or government agency” (*ibid.*), however, the new welfare narratives lead to questioning the linearity of the responsabilization-neo-liberalism association. In fact, the proponents of responsabilization, mostly Catholic scholars, would not like to be labelled as neo-liberal, even not considering all the talk about the damages of capitalist logic in today's society (see, above all, Donati 2015). For this reason, it is necessary to admit not only that there is “an ever-present danger in assuming that there is a new process, rather than a reinvented one” (O'Malley 2009, 278), but also that responsabilization is a pervasive process, not necessarily connected to a specific political-ideological part.

The ‘responsibilization’ issue also calls into question the ‘protection-prevention’ binomial, which is an important coordinate for orientation in welfare narratives. The joint consideration of responsabilization and the prevention/protection approach highlights a significant difference between narratives and scholars: undoubtedly Ferrera is the most cautious with respect to the issue of responsabilization and prevention, while other scholars seem to be supporters of both (on the link between endogenous risks and the importance of prevention in the welfare see Zamagni 2015b). The fact that Ferrera shows to be more aware of the risks that lie also behind a “good” responsabilization is probably also due to the greater familiarity with the criticisms directed at the paradigm, ultimately productivist of European social investment<sup>22</sup>. Indeed the author, although he considers prevention important (understood primarily as education), considers protection absolutely fundamental: citizens

---

<sup>22</sup> Instead Donati (2015, abstract) includes the social investment among the key words that exemplify the “interesting changes” and the “social innovations at the local level throughout Europe”.

have the right to be protected from risks, even beyond their behavior and their alleged responsibilities. The point seven concerns the network governance<sup>23</sup> as a governing method model proposed by all the analyzed welfare narratives. What we want to highlight here is that the issue of network governance is linked to system dynamics and the role of the state. On this point it is useful to recall that Rhodes (2000) distinguishes two schools of thought on network governance: one refers to the power dependency theory, the other to the rational choice theory. Network governance of rational matrix is largely functional (organic, we would be tempted to say) both to the system and to the state, since it consists in a structural arrangement in which public and private networks relate to a specific policy problem in a stable way; while the other type of network governance is characterized by being based on self-organizing networks, which are not accountable to the state and sometimes resist government steering. The former governance arrangement involves the presence of the state with a role of strong coordination aimed at ensuring a cooperative structure. The latter embodies a collaborative governance structure which is largely autonomous from the state.

Point eight is related to the importance in all welfare narratives of the territorial and local dimension. Here there are no substantial differences: in 2W, GW, NWS, and CW, governance, network organization, civil society, and the community are eminently local and territorial. The local-territorial issue allows us to highlight how one of the essential coordinates for understand the welfare narratives presented here is represented by the dichotomy liberal individualism - communitarism. According to liberal individualism, 'the individual' is "an abstract, universal, rational, free and autonomous right-bearing being, who is an entity unto itself, and who has inalienable, deontological rights prior to and 'outside' of community" (Myles 2018, 247). On the contrary, communitarism posit that "the very identity of 'the individual', her self-understanding and agency, stem from this community" (*ibid.*, 245): "an individual is constituted by the language and culture which can only be maintained and renewed in the communities he is part of" and "outside of the continuing conversation of a community [...] human agency [...] would be not just impossible, but inconceivable" (Taylor 1985, 8). The way in which this tension is resolved, in favour of one pole (individualism) rather than another (communitarism), marks – perhaps – the most significant difference between the four welfare discourses. Not surprisingly, the cleavage separates the laity from the Catholics: on the liberal front, we find the 2W of Ferrera; on the communitarian one, we find Donati's NWS, Zamagni's CW, and Vecchiato's GW. The fact that narratives tend towards one pole rather than another does not mean that there are no points of contact. For example, Zamagni and Ferrera openly share neo-Keynesian positions.

Finally, the last point concerns the centrality of the person, a value shared by the authors, albeit with differences. When Ferrera uses the term "individual-person" he certainly does so to highlight the need to personalize welfare services based on the specific needs of the recipient (and in this it is in line with the Catholics), but also because his social science theory has its roots in liberal and methodological individualism. The layout of the other three rhetorical constructions is completely different, here the personism is an explicit alternative both to liberal individualism and to the so-called "ascriptive" communitarianism. The overcoming of an uncritical communitarianism happens through the concept of communality (see Donati 2015, 6 and 7): in today's globalized society "it would be more defensible to think of persons as communal beings as being defined by linguistic, ancestral, geographical or some such 'communitarian community'"(Myles 2018, 261).

---

<sup>23</sup> Essential references on network governance are, *inter al.*, Pierre and Peters 2000; and Rhodes 2000; Kooiman 2003; Turnbull 2003; Newman 2004.

## Conclusions

The paper introduced and discussed the four new welfare narratives dominating the public discourse in Italy: the Second Welfare, the Generative Welfare, the (New) Welfare Society and the Civil Welfare. These narratives have been developed by those whom Ferrera (2012, 16) calls “performers of ideological acts”<sup>24</sup> as “second hand dealers of philosophical ideas for political purposes, i.e. with a view to problem solving and consensus building”. The political purpose is explicit, here: the reform of the traditional welfare state. The brief profiles traced allows us to say that three of the authors – Donati, Zamagni, and the same Ferrera – belong to the category of “professional philosophers” or “social scientists with philosophical competence”, “acting as public intellectuals” (*ibid.*). Unlike the others, Vecchiato can be, to some extent, identified as “policy middlemen (à la Hecllo), i.e. scholars/intellectuals who operate at the cross-road between academia and policy making” (*ibid.*), since the Zancan Foundation ultimately plays the role of a think tank. One aspect on which it is worth pausing to reflect is that, although all of them are capable of “use ordinary discursive arenas (the media, parliaments, electoral campaigns, policy making institutions), but also dedicated arenas, established around a given collective problem” (*ibid.*), they dispose of unequal resources to convey their ideological messages. The question of resources is relevant: these matter in the affirmation of ideologies and in the likelihood of transforming them into reforms, above all. Here, we will not try to establish who of the proponents is, from this point of view, in a position of advantage, but it is certainly useful to remember that Donati has one of the most powerful sociological schools behind him, Zamagni relies on the support of the Vatican and Ferrera has important relations with the international epistemic community that deals with welfare and, more materially, with the two major Italian banking foundations, Compagnia di San Paolo and Cariplo, which in fact are among the financiers of his Observatory on “Second Welfare”. The Zancan Foundation also sees among its financiers some banking foundations – Compagnia di San Paolo, Cariplo and Con il Sud (With the South) Foundation – for which it also carries out scientific consultancy; furthermore, it is closed to the Paduan church. However, the success of the narratives does not depend only on the more material and tangible resources of the proponents and their networks, but also on their persuasive capacity, even purely of surface, i.e. on their attractiveness. The “positive flavour” that they emanate, through their slogans and carefully chosen terms, is what matters. This element is undoubtedly able to explain the great fortune of the narrative Generative Welfare, which, beyond the actual productivist matrix, is taken up by some proponents (see Zamagni 2015b) and many left-wing local administrators<sup>25</sup>. Another emblematic example is represented by what we could call the meta-rhetoric of the Community Welfare or, in other words, the Community Care, which could also have been the ninth point of the list of the common elements of the four narratives introduced.

---

<sup>24</sup> As Ferrera explains (2012, 10-11), referring to the categories of discursive neo-institutionalism (Schmidt 2008), ideological acts are “located in-between philosophical and programmatic ideas: ‘they keep a foot in the realm of political thought and a foot in the realm of political action’ (Frieden 1996)”.

<sup>25</sup> An example is provided by the WeCare Strategy promoted by the Piedmont Region, with the support of its twelve Banking Foundations, co-financed by the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund for Social Innovation. The purpose of this strategy is “to create a generative vision, where those who use services must be enabled to establish relations of reciprocity and co-responsibility with the services themselves and with other citizens”. However, Piedmont is not the only Region with a center-left government to adopt a GW perspective; there is also the Sardinia Region, whose health administrator has used the GW in defining personalized disability support plans, and the Campania Region which refers to the GW in its 2016-18 social plan.

This narrative is beginning to proliferate in Italy, due to the appealing idea that the community can – and should – be at the same time the recipient, referent, place, resource and participant in taking charge of its vulnerable subjects. However, the fact that Margaret Thatcher was the first to promote the community care model in Great Britain, as a possible solution to the unsustainable costs of public welfare in the face of what could already be called “permanent austerity” ( Pierson 1998; 2001) is not known or never mentioned. The reason for the success of this ideological construction undoubtedly lies in the positive flavor of the narration of the ethical and moral assumptions from which this idea moves, such as the belief that the protection of vulnerable people is better ensured within their homes rather than in residential institutions, deemed not able to guarantee a sufficiently personalized and respectful approach to the human, social and cultural needs of the person. The narrative-value attractiveness of Community Care has, so to speak, obscured its more prosaic aims of public savings, as well as the associated risks.

After all the promises and supposed virtues mentioned in the paragraphs of presentation of the four welfare narratives, in these conclusions we would like to point out the attention precisely on the risks. The major risks of the four narratives, but also of the idea of Community Welfare, which represent – it should be remembered – possible lines of reform of the current Italian welfare system, are hidden behind two terms: responsabilization and de-statization. In other words, they lie in the responsibility of the shift from regular producers to citizens as co-producers, just to use the co-production terms of Brudney and England (1983). The risk associated with the delegation strategy is twofold and consists of a hyper-responsibilization of the citizens and a de-responsibilization of the institutions. The risks connected to the hyper-responsibilization of the private sphere – individual, families and informal networks life – are even more troubling in a context like the Italian one, in which we encounter a permanent strong familism and families policies unsupported. In this context, even the “good” responsabilization evoked by the Catholic narratives, risks to become a do-it-yourself welfare (Eriksson, Vogt 2012), and/or activate a series of negotiation processes between public administration and citizens, thus consolidating of a «particularistic» regulation of social welfare services (Rossi 2017).

In this sense, the risk is represented precisely by the privatization so feared also by our scholars (*inter. al.* see Zamagni 2015 b; Donati 2015). The privatization process recalls the characteristics of the privatism of Baldock and Ungerson (1996), which consists in the phenomenon by which the attention of citizens is “devoted overwhelmingly to home and family based life rather than to sociability of a more widely-based kind” (Goldthorpe *et al.* 1969,103 – quoted in *ibid.*)<sup>26</sup>. This type of privatization represents exactly the opposite of socialization and the social reappropriation of public space.

The risk of privatization can go beyond the it can go beyond lifestyles and the more private sphere. In fact, it is worth underlining that in the narratives discussed, an important role is played by the for-profit private sector, companies and multinationals. In a system deprived of the state guidance and protection, the interests and the logics (economic and capitalist) of these actors could overwhelm even the most authentically social orientation of the other components of the society, especially in the absence of adequate reforms of the Third Sector.

Even the fact that the new welfare narratives can be traced back to New Public Governance, that is to say to what appears to be an administrative rhetoric and progressive governance just because of its reactive origin to New Public Management, does not represent a valid barricade against such risks. Indeed, this rhetoric was formed by “layering or sedimentation” (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), thus incorporating market logic and New Public Management (Cataldi 2018).

---

<sup>26</sup> For this phenomenon, a special expression exists in the Italian language: “riflusso nel privato” which means “reflux in the private sphere”. This expression is ideologically connoted and dates back to the late 1970s.

To conclude, in prefiguring and undertaking a path of welfare reform it is necessary to keep in mind the risks behind the slogan “more responsibility to the private sector and less state”.

### References

- Agostini C. and Ascoli U. (2014), Il welfare occupazionale: un’occasione per la ricalibratura del modello italiano?, in «Politiche Sociali», n. 2, pp. 263-279.
- Arendt H. (1958), *The Human Condition*, Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- Ascoli U. (ed.) (2011), *Il welfare in Italia*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Baldock J. and Ungerson C. (1996), *Becoming Consumers of Community Care*, in *The Sociological Review*, 44, S1, pp.11-35.
- Brudney J.L. and England R.E. (1983), *Toward a Definition of the Coproduction Concept*, in «Public Administration Review», 43, 1, pp. 59-65.
- Bruni L. and Zamagni S. (2004), *Economia Civile*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Bruni L. and Zamagni S. (2015), *L’economia civile. Un’altra idea di mercato*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Buchanan J. (1997), “La crisi nelle democrazie del welfare”, in Arcelli M. (ed.), *Globalizzazione dei mercati e orizzonti del capitalismo*, Laterza, Roma.
- Canali C., Geron D., and Vecchiato T. (2019) *Italian families living in poverty: Perspectives on their needs, supports and strengths*, in «Children and Youth Services Review», 97, pp. 30-35.
- Casey B.H. and Dostal J.M. (2013) *Voluntary pension saving for old age. Are the objectives of self-responsibility and security compatible?*, in «Social Policy and Administration», 47, 3 pp. 287-309.
- Cataldi L. (2015), *Coproduzione: uno strumento di riforma in tempi di austerità?*, in «Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche», 1, pp. 59-86.
- Cataldi L. (2018), *New Public Governance as a state resilience strategy. The Italian Secondo Welfare narrative as a test case*, International Symposium on “Implementing Collaborative Governance”, 25<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> October, Palermo.
- Cataldi L. and Tousijn W. (2015). *Quale managerialismo nei servizi sociali? Considerazioni critiche*, Polis, 2, pp. 157-190.
- Christensen T. and Lægread P. (2007), *The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform*, 67, 6, pp. 1059-66.
- Dean H. (2007) *The ethics of welfare-to-work*, in «Policy & Politics», 35, 4, pp. 573-590.
- Donati P. (1986), *La famiglia nella società relazionale. Nuove reti e nuove regole*, FrancoAngeli, Milano.
- Donati P. (1991), *Teoria relazionale della società*, FrancoAngeli, Milano.
- Donati P. (2000), *La cittadinanza societaria*, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
- Donati P. (2013), *Relational Sociology and the Globalized Society*, in Dépelteau F. and Powell C. (eds.), “Applying Relational Sociology. Relations, Networks, and Society”, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1 – 24.
- Donati P. (2015), *Beyond the Traditional Welfare State: “Relational Inclusion” and the New Welfare Society*, AIS-PS-SP working paper, 1, pp. 1-21, Roma, url: <http://www.ais-sociologia.it/sezioni/ps/working-papers/>
- Donati P. and Solci R. (2011), *I beni relazionali. Che cosa sono e quali effetti producono*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino.
- Eriksson K. and Vogt H. (2012), *On self-service democracy. Configurations of individualizing governance and self-directed citizenship*, in «European Journal of Social Theory», 16, 2, pp. 153-73.
- Evers A. (2006), *Complementary and Conflicting: The Different Meanings of ‘User Involvement’ in Social Services*, in Matthies A.L. (ed.), *Nordic Civic Society Organisations and The Future of Welfare Services*, Copenhagen, Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 517, pp. 255-76.
- Ferrera M. (1996), *The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe*, in «Journal of European Social Policy», 6, 1996, pp. 17-37.
- Ferrera M. (2006), *Le politiche sociali*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Ferrera M. (2010), *Per il welfare serve più spesa (dei privati)*, «Corriere della Sera», 16 giugno.
- Ferrera M. (2012), *From neo-liberalism to liberal neo-welfarism? Ideologies and social reforms in Europe*, LPF paper, 2, Torino: Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, url:



[https://www.centroeinaudi.it/images/abook\\_file/wp2\\_12\\_ferrera.pdf](https://www.centroeinaudi.it/images/abook_file/wp2_12_ferrera.pdf)

Ferrera, M. (2013). Secondo welfare: perché? Una introduzione, in Maino, F. and Ferrera, M. Primo rapporto sul secondo welfare, pp. 7-13, Torino: Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, url:

[http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/PRIMO\\_RAPPORTO\\_SUL\\_SECONDO\\_WELFARE\\_IN\\_ITALIA.pdf](http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/PRIMO_RAPPORTO_SUL_SECONDO_WELFARE_IN_ITALIA.pdf)

Ferrera M. (2015), Introduzione, in Maino F. and Ferrera M. (eds), Secondo rapporto sul secondo welfare in Italia, Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino, pp. 7-11, url: [http://secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Versione\\_integrale\\_2R2W.pdf](http://secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Versione_integrale_2R2W.pdf)

Ferrera, M. (2017). Introduzione, in Maino F. and Ferrera M. (eds), Terzo rapporto sul secondo welfare in Italia, pp.11-15, Torino: Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, url:

[http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Terzo\\_Rapporto\\_sul\\_secondo\\_welfare\\_in\\_Italia\\_2017\\_Versione\\_integrale.pdf](http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Terzo_Rapporto_sul_secondo_welfare_in_Italia_2017_Versione_integrale.pdf)

Ferrera M (2017), Introduzione, in Maino F. and Ferrera M. (eds), Terzo rapporto sul secondo welfare in Italia, Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino, pp.11-15, url: [http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Terzo\\_Rapporto\\_sul\\_secondo\\_welfare\\_in\\_Italia\\_2017\\_Versione\\_integrale.pdf](http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Terzo_Rapporto_sul_secondo_welfare_in_Italia_2017_Versione_integrale.pdf)

Ferrera M. and Hemerijck A. (2003), *Recalibrating European Welfare Regimes*, in J. Zeitlin e D. Trubeck (eds), *Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 88-128.

Ferrera M. and Maino F. (2014), Social innovation beyond the State. Italy's Secondo Welfare in a European perspective, working paper 2/2014 2W, Torino: Centro di Ricerche e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi.

Folena U. (2017), Zamagni: necessaria una sussidiarietà circolare, newspaper article, in «Avvenire», 21th October, p. 5, url:

[http://www.settimanesociali.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/AVVENIRE\\_21\\_10\\_2017.pdf](http://www.settimanesociali.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/AVVENIRE_21_10_2017.pdf)

Fondazione Zancan (2012), Vincere la povertà con un welfare generativo La lotta alla povertà - Rapporto 2012, il Mulino, Bologna.

Fondazione Zancan (2013), Rigenerare Capacità e Risorse. La lotta alla povertà. Rapporto 2013, il Mulino, Bologna.

Fondazione Zancan (2014), Welfare Generativo. Responsabilizzazione, rendere rigenerare. La lotta alla povertà. Rapporto 2014, il Mulino, Bologna.

Fondazione Zancan (2015), Welfare generativo e azioni a corrispettivo sociale. Una proposta di legge, in Studi Zancan, 6, pp. 14-18.

Freeden M. (1996), *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford, Clarendon.

Hemerijck, A. (2015) The quiet paradigm revolution of social investment, in «Social Politics», 22, 2, pp. 242-256.

Giddens A. (1998), *The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy*. London, Polity Press.

Glenn E. N. (2000), Creating a Caring Society, in «Contemporary Sociology», vol 29, n. 1, pp. 84-94.

Goldthorpe J. H., Lockwood D., Bechofer F., and Platt J., (1969) *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jessoula M. (2017), Welfare occupazionale: le sfide oltre le promesse. Una introduzione, in la Rivista delle Politiche Sociali, 2, pp. 9-24.

Jessoula M., Graziano P., and Madama I. (2010), «Selective flexicurity» in segmented labour markets: the case of Italian mid-siders, *Journal of Social Policy*, 39, 4, pp. 561-583.

Kendall J. and Knapp M. (1995), A Loose and Baggy Monster: Boundarifiers, Definitions and Typologies, in Smith J.D, Rochester C., and Hedley R. (eds) (1995), *An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector*, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 66-95.

Kiser L. and Percy S.L. (1980), The Concept of Coproduction and Its implication for Public Service Delivery, ASPA paper, San Francisco, 13th-16th April.

Keynes J.M. (1939) (1982), *The collected writings of J.M. Keynes*, London, Macmillan, Vol. XII.

Knijn T., Martin C., and Millar, J. (2007) 'Activation as a framework for social policies towards lone parents: is there a continental specificity?', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol 41, issue 6, pp. 638-652.

Kooiman J. (2003), *Governing as Governance*, London, Sage.

Lindbeck A. (2008), Prospects for the Welfare State, IFN Working Paper, No. 731, Research Institute for Industrial Economics, url:

<http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp731.pdf>

Mahoney J. and Thelen K. (2010), *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Maino F. (2012), Un secondo Welfare per i nuovi bisogni, in «il Mulino», n.5, pp. 833-841.
- Maino F. (2013), Tra nuovi bisogni e vincoli di bilancio: protagonisti, risorse e innovazione sociale, in Maino F. and Ferrera M. (eds), Primo rapporto sul secondo welfare in Italia, Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino, pp. 17-46, url: [http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/PRIMO\\_RAPPORTO\\_SUL\\_SECONDO\\_WELFARE\\_IN\\_ITALIA.pdf](http://www.secondowelfare.it/edt/file/PRIMO_RAPPORTO_SUL_SECONDO_WELFARE_IN_ITALIA.pdf)
- Maino F. (2015), Secondo welfare e territorio: risorse, prestazioni, attori, reti, in Maino F. and Ferrera M. (eds), Secondo rapporto sul secondo welfare in Italia, Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino, pp. 15-42, url: [http://secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Versione\\_integrale\\_2R2W.pdf](http://secondowelfare.it/edt/file/Versione_integrale_2R2W.pdf)
- Myles N. O. (2018), 'The individual' in the individualism/communitarianism debate: In defense of personism, in *Legon Journal of the Humanities*, 29, 2, pp. 241-263, url: <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ljh/article/view/181062>
- Natali D. (2009), The Italian Welfare State (still) in Transition: The Progressive Recalibration of Social Programmes and Greater Flexibility of Labour Market Policies, in Schubert K., Hegelich S., and U. Bazant (eds.), *The Handbook of European Welfare Systems*, Routledge, New York, pp. 277-293.
- Newman J. (2004), *Constructing Accountability: Network Governance and Managerial Agency*, Public Policy and Administration, pp. 17-33.
- Newman J. (2007), The 'double dynamics' of activation: institutions, citizens and the remaking of welfare governance, in «*International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*», 27, 9-10, pp. 364-87
- O'Malley P. (2009), Responsibilization, in Wakefield A. and Fleming J., *The SAGE Dictionary of Policing*, SAGE, London, pp. 277-278.
- Osborne S.P. (2006), The New Public Governance, *Public Management Review*, 8, 3, pp. 377-87.
- Ostrom E. (1996), Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy and Development, in «*World Development*», 24, 6, pp. 1073-1087.
- Pavolini E. and Raitano M. (2015), L'Europa mediterranea fra diritti sociali e crisi economica: il welfare state ai tempi dell'austerità. Un'introduzione, in «*Mediterranea*», 83, pp. 9-30.
- Pierson P. (1998), Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects: Post-Industrial Welfare States Confront Permanent Austerity, in «*Journal of European Public Policy*», vol. 5, n. 4, pp. 539-560.
- Pierson P. (2001), Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies, in Pierson P. (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 410-56.
- Powell M., Doheny S., Greener I., and Mills N. (2009), Introduction: Managing the 'Unmanageable Consumer', in Simmons R., Powell M., Greener I. (eds.), *The Consumer in Public Services Bristol*, The Policy Press.
- Putnam R.D., Leonardi R. and Nanetti R.Y. (1993), *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ranci C. and Pavolini E. (2015) Le traiettorie attuali di cambiamento, in Ranci C., Pavolini E., eds, *Le politiche di welfare*, Bologna, il Mulino, pp. 75-109.
- Rhodes R.A.W. (2000), *Governance and Public Administration*, in Pierre J., *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Governance*, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 54-90.
- Rossi P. (2017), Il welfare come merito? Logiche di responsabilizzazione e processi di individualizzazione nell'accesso ai servizi socioassistenziali, in *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia*, pp. 579-614.
- Saraceno C. (2013), Three concurrent crises in welfare states in an increasingly asymmetrical European Union, in *Stato e Mercato*, 3, 99, pp. 339-358.
- Sharp E.B. (1980), Toward a New Understanding of Urban Services and Citizen Participation: The Coproduction Concept, in «*Midwest Review of Public Administration*», 14, pp. 105-118.
- Schmidt V. (2008), Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, pp. 303-326.
- Smyth P. and Deeming C. (2016), The 'social investment perspective' in social policy. A longue durée perspective, in «*Social Policy & Administration*», 50, 6, pp. 673-90.
- Streeck W. and Theelen K. (eds.) (2005), *Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Taylor C. (1985). *Philosophy and the human sciences: Philosophical Papers*, vol.2 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor-Gooby P. (ed.) (2004), *New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

- Titmuss R.M. (1958), *Essays on the Welfare State*, George Allen and Unwin, London.
- Tsui M. and Cheung F.C.H. (2004), *Gone with the Wind*, in «British Journal of Social Work», 34, 3, pp. 437-442.
- Turnbull S. (2003), *Network Governance*, *Corporate Governance International*, 6, 3, pp. 4-14.
- van Kersbergen K. and Hemerijck A (2012), *Two Decades of Change in Europe: The Emergence of the Social Investment State*, *Journal of Social Policy*, 41, 3, pp. 475-92.
- Vecchiato T. (2013), *Verso un welfare generativo: da costo a investimento*, in «Prospettive Sociali e Sanitarie», 3, url:  
[http://www.welfaregenerativo.it/media/uploads/WelfareGenerativo\\_FondazioneZancan.pdf](http://www.welfaregenerativo.it/media/uploads/WelfareGenerativo_FondazioneZancan.pdf)
- Vecchiato T. (2015), *Poverty in Italy and Generative Welfare Approach*, in Fernandez E., Zeira A., Vecchiato T., and Canali C. (eds), *Theoretical and Empirical Insight into Child and Family Poverty*, Springer.
- Vecchiato T. (2018) *Le sette piaghe del welfare*, in *Studi Zancan*, 3, pp. 5-18.
- Whitaker G.P. (1980), *Coproduction*, in «Public Administration Review», 40, 3, pp. 240-246.
- Zamagni S. (1991), *Mercato, Stato, Società Civile*, *Rivista di Teologia Morale*, 22, pp. 301-311.
- Zamagni S. (ed.) (1998), *Non profit come economia civile*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Zamagni S. (ed.) (2002), *Il non profit italiano al bivio*, Milano, Egea.
- Zamagni S. (2005), *Equità, razionamento, diritto alle cure sanitarie*, in «Medicina E Morale», 54(2); free version url:  
<http://fidae.soluzione.eu/AreaLibera/AreeTematiche/Scienza%20e%20Fede/Stefano%20ZAMAGNI,%20Equit%C3%A0,%20razionamento,%20diritto%20alle%20cure.pdf>
- Zamagni S. (2007), *L'economia del bene comune*, Città Nuova, Roma
- Zamagni S. (2015a), *Verso il Welfare Civile*, conference paper, Casale Monferrato, 30th January, url:  
<http://www.itinerariosociopolitico.it/public/Verso-il-Welfare-Civile---Prof.-Zamagni.pdf>
- Zamagni S. (2015b), *L'evoluzione dell'idea di welfare: verso il welfare civile*, *aiccon short paper*, 8, pp.1-21, url:  
<https://www.aiccon.it/pubblicazione/levoluzione-dellidea-welfare-verso-welfare-civile/>
- Zamagni S. and Zamagni V. (2012), *Famiglia e lavoro. Opposizione o armonia?*, Edizioni San Paolo, Milano.