

**Trajectories in outsourcing ECEC services under austerity conditions.
The case of Italy**

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Abstract

In the last two decades in Italy outsourcing represented an important strategy for municipalities, one of the main care service providers, not only to expand Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) services, but also to ensure the provision of existing ones, under conditions of austerity which became particularly harsh after 2008-9. However, the analysis, carried out by elaborating data on provision integrated with interviews to key informants, shows how outsourcing played out very differently in crèches and kindergartens, the most important services of the two educational cycles of the ECEC system. As explained in the paper, reasons for these differences lie in their historical and institutional path as well as in their organisation, with a very different role played by the central state. Beyond making more difficult the integration of the ECEC services, in both cases outsourcing raises some important risks, especially in terms of service quality.

1. Introduction: ECEC system in Italy and the pressures for change

In the last two decades in Italy, as in other European countries, the Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) system for 0-5 year-old children has

been subject to significant pressures and tensions, which directly or indirectly prompted relevant changes in childcare services.

Social and demographic long-term trends, such as the increasing female participation in the labour market have brought an increasing demand for childcare services in many European countries, highlighting their importance both from an educational and training perspective and from a socio-economic one. On one hand, ECEC services significantly help promoting the cognitive development and long-term learning in children: this means that they may have an extremely important role in hindering the transfer of social inequalities from one generation to another, by reducing the disadvantages resulting from belonging to a family in difficult socio-economic conditions. On the other hand, ECEC services are a direct and indirect vehicle for promoting female employment: in fact, not only they represent a sector with a very high level of female employment, but they also help achieving a better balancing of private and working life by promoting equal opportunities (Esping-Andersen, 2002). For those reasons, an extended provision of ECEC services is promoted by the European Union, within the wider “social investment strategy” (European Commission 2013a; 2013b).

The potential of ECEC services has been traditionally unrecognised by the Italian family-based welfare system (Ferrera, 1996; Esping-Andersen, 1999) and familistic care model (Anttonen and Sipilä, 1996, see also the discussion about Italy and Spain in León and Migliavacca, 2013). In particular, as other Mediterranean countries Italy has always relied mainly on families for the care of children aged under 3 years-old. A clear evidence of this historical feature of the Italian welfare system is the low rate of coverage of ECEC services for 0-2 year-olds.

In order to answer to the increasing service demand, since 2000 national as well as regional and local governments have gradually introduced measures aimed at expanding provision and coverage of crèches and other childcare services for children under 3 years-old. These measures did not break the longstanding inertia of ECEC national policy in Italy (Da Roit and Sabatinelli, 2013; Sabatinelli, 2016), which had followed until 2017, but contributed to increase the service coverage.

According to the most comprehensive data, the children provided with formal care as a percentage of all children in the same age group (under 3 years-old) increased from 14,8% to 23,9% between 2008 and 2016 (Idi, 2018). If we include also children with less than 3 years attending a service for children with at least 3 years (a kindergarten) this rate raises up to 29,2%, with very relevant Regional differences. Other sources are more restrictive in the services to be included in the ratio, setting the service coverage at 13% in 2016 (Istat, datawarehouse). However, all figures are under the coverage rate originally set by European Union as a target for 2010 (33%) at the Council of Lisbon in 2000.

Moreover, an increasing awareness of the educational importance of integrating childcare services for children from 0 to 5 years-old has progressively emerged. As in many European Mediterranean and Continental countries, and unlike Scandinavian countries, two separate educational segments or cycles can be distinguished in the Italian ECEC system. The first includes the childcare services for children with less than 3 years-old (such as crèches and other kinds of services), which are all provided by municipalities, which are the main provider terms of users, and private organisations. Central State is excluded by provision and traditionally made only a very limited investment in terms of regulations and financing.

The second cycle is constituted by kindergartens, namely the main and nearly exclusive educational service for 3-5 year-old children. A kindergarten is considered a school (not simply an educational or socio-educational service), as clearly expressed by its official name of *scuola dell'infanzia* (“childhood school”). The classification of “school” translated into a commitment of the central state that for fifty years now has been much stronger and more direct than in childcare for 0-2 year-olds: the central Ministry of Education directly runs the majority of kindergartens, covering more than 61% of users, with peaks of over 80% in Central-Southern Italy. Children enrolled to private “state authorised” kindergartens are nearly 30% and about 10% attended at a municipal kindergarten (elaborations on Istat datawarehouse).

Also, since the end of the 1960s regulation and financial investment by the central state has been much more relevant than in the case of crèches and other services for 0-2 year-old children. This engagement is reflected, on one hand, in the coverage rate, which is 97-98% of all children from 4 years-old to the beginning of primary school (the indicator used in international comparison), well above the EU target set at the Council of Lisbon (95%). On the other hand, the central state investment and the status of school allow State kindergartens to be nearly free at the point of use; the same applies to municipal schools, where families may be asked to pay a small contribution, while in private kindergartens fees vary according to the specific situations. However, these are certainly much lower than average fees in both municipal and private crèches.

Also the staff qualification has been different until very recent times. Teachers in kindergartens have a higher qualification because they need to be graduate (starting nearly twenty years ago); for educational staff working in

the crèches the same qualification has been introduced only by the 2017 reform.

The institution of an integrated ECEC system for children under 6 years-old is the deliberate purpose of the childcare reform approved in 2017 (legislative decree no. 65/2017). The reform defines a new institutional framework, characterised by a wide responsibility of the central state for financing and regulation the first cycle of ECEC services. Among its numerous objectives, there are a substantial increase in service coverage of 0-2 year-old services, a reduction in the inequalities in service access and the homogenisation in the quality of services provided by all the ECEC providers.

Expansive policies and, more recently, 2017 reform have been carried out under conditions of austerity in public finance, which started, by and large, in the middle of 1990s, became very severe in the years following the economic and financial crisis exploded in 2008-09 and have partially lasted until now (for austerity policies and their impact on the welfare system see the special issue of the “European Journal of Social Security”, 17, 2, edited by E. Pavolini and A. Guillen, 2015).

The crisis not only made very difficult to expand service provision, but also severely challenged the capacity of public authorities to provide the existing ECEC services. In particular, austerity policies imposed severe restrictions on municipalities (Bordogna and Neri, 2014; Meardi, 2014) which are, as mentioned, the main provider of 0-2 year-old educational services and a relevant provider of those addressed to 3-5 year-old children. Restrictions imposed on municipalities forced them to search for alternative solutions to give continuity to the provision of their childcare services: in these conditions, outsourcing constituted an important strategy not only to extend service provision, but also to ensure the provision of the existing ones (Bordogna and

Neri, 2014; Wollmann, Koprić and Maréou et al., 2018). However, as we will show, outsourcing played out differently in the main services (crèches and kindergartens) of the two educational cycles in the ECEC system.

Outsourcing has important consequences on the municipal childcare services. One of the most important ones comes from the change in employment regulation of the service staff, with a shift from the local government national collective labour agreement to other agreements used in the childcare sector. Beyond the local government agreement, in this field there is another public sector collective labour agreement, that of school sector used in state kindergartens, and various agreements adopted in the private sector, with a high level of fragmentation in working conditions. From the employer's perspective, all the private sector agreements are "cheaper" than the local government one because they ensure minor labour costs and a higher level of flexibility by human resources. Conversely, the state school agreement is more "expensive" than the local government, providing teachers with a higher salary in terms of cost per hour.

Changes in employment regulation risk undermining at least some of the conditions (teamwork and collegiality in teaching, collective and participatory management, training opportunities) which, according to literature, significantly contribute to the service quality and have been best ensured over time by the local government agreement, even compared to the state school contract (Zurru, 2014). Therefore, the crisis and transformation of childcare municipal service might result in a worsening not only in staff conditions, but also in the quality of the services provided.

In the following pages, we will briefly focus on the austerity policies imposed on municipalities, showing how the impact of these policies on childcare

services intensified outsourcing processes. Then we will describe the different trajectories emerged in outsourcing between crèches and kindergartens, trying to make some explanatory hypothesis. The analysis is based on the elaboration of official quantitative data, integrated by 18-20 interviews made to key respondents in the childcare sector at national and also at local level in Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, and Piedmont (municipal and state kindergartens managers, private employer and trade union representatives, managers of the Ministry of Education). Moreover, the paper resorted also to the results of previous research carried out by the author and some colleagues, focused on the analysis of some case studies located in Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy and Tuscany (Neri, 2016; Dorigatti, Neri and Mori, forthcoming).

2. Austerity policies in the local government: the crisis of municipal ECEC services

The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 introduced a severe economic crisis in Italy, with recessions in 2008-2009 and 2012-2013, as well as GDP growth rates of under 1% for nearly all subsequent years up to the present (OECD and Eurostat data-warehouse). Moreover, dramatic increases in public debt, the highest in the EU after Greece (see e.g. Eurostat data-warehouse), were matched by a growing perception that austerity measures taken by government were inadequate in tackling the public financial crisis, spreading fear that Italy would be unable not only to comply with the EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules, but also to repay its debt (Jones, 2012). Within the context of the financial crisis previously affecting Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, a sovereign debt crisis fully consumed Italy between summer and autumn 2011. During this time, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi resigned and his center-right government was substituted by a “grand

coalition”, headed by the economist and former EU Commissioner Mario Monti (Jones, 2012).

The economic and financial crisis required the adoption of several austerity packages, particularly in years 2011-12 under pressure by the EU and the financial markets (Bordogna and Neri, 2014). The austerity packages comprised a varying mix of tax increases and expenditure cuts, with many measures affecting public sector expenditures and public sector employment. This included local government, that is provinces and, in particular, municipalities which became one of the preferred targets of the austerity measures. In order to meet the requirements of the EU Stability Pact, local government authorities were asked for increasing contributions which amounted to a total amount of 13 billion and 638 million euro from 2008 to 2015 (Corte dei Conti, 2015). In the same years, funding from central government was significantly reduced, with cuts amounting to more than 8 million euro for municipalities. Cuts were only partially compensated with an increase in local taxes.

Moreover, serious restrictions were repeatedly placed on staff costs and turnover. Summing up, the main measures in this field imposed to municipalities and provinces, part of which regarded the entire public sector, were as follows:

- a) a general statutory obligation to progressively reduce personnel expenditure, including salaries and staff numbers;
- b) a freeze of national level negotiations for the 2010-2012 bargaining round (then extended to 2014) and a pay freeze until the end of 2014, prohibiting any wage increase which would bring the salary of all public employees, including local government employees, above the 2010 level.;

- c) a ban on any new temporary and permanent hiring, where the ratio between personnel expenditure and total current expenditure of a municipality exceeds 50%;
- d) restrictions in staff turnover, both for permanent employees and temporary employees. For example, with regard to permanent employees, from 2012 to 2015 legislation limited the possibility to hire new employees to an expenditure not exceeding 40% of the labour cost of retired employees of the previous year (from 2008 to April 2012 this cap was 20%).

Most of these measures were progressively relaxed starting in 2016, while a new national employment contract for Regions and local government staff was finally agreed in February 2018. However, the impact of the austerity policies on local government staff was very relevant and is likely to have permanent consequences on municipal services.

According to the official data of the Minister of Economy and Finance - State Accounting Office (Mef-Rgs, 2016), the number of employees of Regions and local authorities went from approximately 516,000 in 2007 to a little less than 473,000 in 2014 (-9.1%, a drop of almost four points above that recorded in the public sector as a whole, although this drop may be underestimated for reasons related to the 2014 survey). According to calculations by Ifel, the Research Institute of National Association of Italian Municipalities, from 2007 to 2014 municipal employees in service fell from approximately 480,000 (479,233) to a little under 417,000 (416,964), a 13.0% decrease. In the same period, personnel per 1,000 residents went from 8.04 in 2007 to 6.89 in 2014 (Ifel, 2016).

Personnel reduction made it quite difficult for the municipal authorities to continue to provide services under direct management, as they faced increasing staff shortages. Among the services that were mainly called into

question were childcare services for 0-6 year-olds. The need to meet national or regional regulatory standards in the supply of service personnel and, broadly speaking, their labour intensive nature makes them strongly dependent on staff availability, making them highly sensitive to staff shortage crisis. Difficulties of municipal services were (and are) more significant, for the whole ECEC service system, in Northern Italy, Centre-North and in the larger cities, where the contribution of local authorities to the service provision is traditionally greater.

Besides their weight in quantitative terms, municipal childcare services represent a reference point that is difficult to ignore, and a model for all other operators from the quality point of view, with points of excellence recognised at the international level (Gandini and Edwards, Moss and Petrie, 2002).

In the face of the difficulties, the solution seems to be contracting out services to private (for profit and, especially, not-for profit) providers, independent from the local authorities but receiving most of their funding from them. Outsourcing processes started well before the economic crisis, but they were certainly accelerated and intensified after 2008-09 and, especially, the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis and the related financial emergency in public finance. However, externalisation processes took quite different routes in the two ECEC cycles, as we are going to illustrate in the next paragraph.

3. Different trajectories of outsourcing in ECEC services

Outsourcing and contracting out in municipal educational services are general trends which involve childcare services both for 0-2 year-old children and for 3-5 year-olds. However, data on the distribution of users between different kinds of provider highlight relevant differences in the externalisation processes carried out in the two cycles of the Italian ECEC services. Table 1

and table 2 in the appendix report the number and percentage of users, distinguished according the kind of provider, respectively in crèches and kindergartens and their evolution across time (elaborations on official data from Istat datawarehouse).

From 2000 to 2014 (most recent available data), users attending a crèche increased from 104,742 to 181,162, but users' distribution according to the kind of providers significantly changed. In terms of users, municipal provision stepped from about 87.000 to nearly 100.000 children, but private providers nearly multiplied by four its users, stepping from almost 18.000 to about 67.000 children. Expressed in percentage. users attending a municipal crèches dropped from 83% to 60% of the total users, while users in private crèches increased from 17% to 40%. These official Istat data do not include users provided with a contribution by the municipalities and this is likely to determine on overestimation of the rate of users in municipal services in the year 2014. Another source reports a lower rate for municipal services, that would amount to 51.8% of users in 2016 (Idi, 2018).

As to kindergartens, Istat data series, which start from the school year 2008-9, highlight a different evolution. First of all, from 2008-9 to 2014-15 the total number of users is stable, having only a very slight drop, which amounted to about 4,000 units. This reflects the almost universal coverage by kindergartens and then the lack of any need to increase service provision, unlike crèches. In most recent years, and nowadays, it is likely that the number of users started declining because of the decline in the number of births.

Within this global picture, from 2008-09 to 2014-15 the number of users attending at a municipal kindergarten declined of about 30,000 units, dropping from 11% to 9% of total users. Quite similarly, private providers

lost about 20.000 users, dropping from 30% to 29% of total users. Decline in private provision started after 2012-13 reversing an historical trend of expansion, probably because of the effects of the economic crisis both on private providers and users. Conversely, state kindergartens increased the number of users of more than 46.000 units, stepping from 59% to 62% of total kindergarten users.

These data show the continuation of long-term processes of kindergarten “statalisation” started at the end of the 1960s, after state kindergartens were instituted by law no. 444/1968. Unlike previous decades, after 2000 and in the last decade statalisation was certainly not promoted or encouraged by the central government, which was committed to austerity policies as the whole public sector. There is not a deliberate replacement of kindergarten places and classes run by municipalities with others managed by the state. There is not any formally recognized contracting out as it may happen with private providers. According to information collected by the interviews, in most of the cases the gradual reduction in the available places in municipal kindergarten is replaced by the state, filling or, rather, saturating the available supply existing in state kindergartens. These have suffered from constraints in staff expenditure and turn-over, but to the same extent as for municipal kindergartens, having also more possibilities to resort to temporary teachers. In the last year, this imperceptible but continuing statalisation has involved also private providers, probably to the effect of the economic crisis both on families and providers.

However, if we integrate statistical data with the information collected by interviews and with the result of previous research carried out at local level, more complex processes of change emerge, especially in the case of kindergartens. Outsourcing of ECEC services often did not have private

providers or the state as recipients. In an increasing number of cases, municipal childcare services were transferred to “foundations”, “joint-stock companies” or so-called “special companies” (Neri, 2016; Dorigatti, Mori and Neri, 2018). These are organisational bodies or entities which, on one hand, are formally independent from municipalities, being provided with their own public or private legal status, on the other hand, are totally owned or are under the control of the municipalities. Such kinds of providers are therefore characterised by a hybrid or intermediate nature between directly managed units and private organisations legally independent from local authorities¹.

The hybrid solutions present a series of advantages for the municipalities. Firstly, the transfer of services to these entities usually does not produce resistance as strong as that produced by outsourcing to independent private sector providers, since it is believed that direct municipal participation is able to provide greater guarantees of continuity with respect to the past. Moreover, the hybrid organisations are at least partially exempted by the restrictions on staff costs and turnover to which the direct management of the local authorities is subject. This means that, in the years of the austerity packages, hybrid organisations controlled by municipalities were allowed to hire the personnel needed to tackle with the staff shortage existing in the previously directly managed services.

Finally, as happens with outsourcing to private providers, also service transfer to hybrid organisations often allows to change the employment regulation of the staff, by switching from the national collective labour agreement of the

¹ There are no data on the diffusion of the different management structures in childcare services of Italian municipal authorities. On this issue the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) is carrying out a survey.

local government to one of the “cheaper” agreements existing in the private childcare sector.

As far as we know by interviews and previous research, hybrid organisations are more used for kindergartens than for crèches and other services for children under 3 years-old. And even when all ECEC municipal services are transferred to a hybrid organisation, evidence from the case study analysis highlights that the decision to outsource the services to that kind of organisation instead of contracting out to a private provider, usually lies in the presence of kindergartens. Although also kindergartens are contracted out to private providers, this major attitude to rely on hybrids contributes to emphasize the differences in the structure of provision existing in the two ECEC cycles.

4. Why different trajectories? Searching for explanations

The analysis carried out in the previous pages identified the existence of different trajectories in the outsourcing of the two main services in the Italian ECEC system, both concerning services traditionally provided by municipalities. In the case of crèches, contracting out to private providers was used first to expand service coverage and then also to maintain it, in the era of austerity. In the case of kindergartens, the main recipients of the reduction in municipal services seem to be the state kindergartens, which helped giving continuity and not reducing the levels of provision. Moreover, new hybrid organisations emerged among service providers, resulting more widespread in the second ECEC cycle (3-5 year-olds) than in the first one (0-2 year-olds). In order to explain these different paths, many factors can be identified, mostly related to the different history, organisation and regulation of the two educational cycles of the Italian ECEC system.

In the ECEC municipal services for children under 3 years-old, until the last decade contracting out has mainly involved the opening of new services, allowing an expansion of the provision, as happened also in Spain (León, Ranci, Sabatinelli and Ibáñez, 2018), but it had not concerned the transfer of previously directly managed service by the municipality yet, as happened in recent years because of the austerity policies

While in the first case outsourcing is more acceptable, in the second case it often meets strong opposition from various stakeholders, such as service staff, unions, users and local communities (Dorigatti, Mori and Neri, 2018). Staff and union opposition grounded on the one side on the protection of the public jobs and their working conditions, while on the other on the safeguard of the public management in these services. However, resistance to outsourcing often involved also users and local communities, who represent an important part of voters and of the constituency of local politicians.

Beyond fears of a loss in service quality, in many cases the opposition to the externalisation by local communities lies in the idea that municipal services are a fundamental part not only of the cultural heritage of the community, but also of the whole endowment of interpersonal and institutional relationships developed between the public authority and the citizenship. Particularly in Emilia-Romagna, but also in other areas of the Centre and North of Italy this municipal tradition found one of its main expressions in the childcare sector, where it has been developed since the 1950s and the 1960s, becoming a constitutive component of the social and cultural context.

In the second cycle of ECEC services, these social and cultural elements embedded within municipal educational services are stronger and more widespread than in the first cycle, because they are strengthened by the nature of “school” assumed by the kindergartens, since many decades. Contracting

out kindergartens to private providers is very often interpreted as a “school privatisation” by a relevant part of the local public opinion and opposition to privatisation finds a fundamental nourishment and support in the common belief that the school and education must be “public” and not “private”, embodying the value of universalism, equality and citizenship.

These value are not so strictly associated to crèches and other ECEC services for children under 3 years-old, which are still considered, by a relevant portion of the population, part of the social assistance system and not of the educational system: in a word, “care” more than “education”.

Moreover, union and staff opposition to privatisation in kindergartens is also more legitimated by the higher level of professionalism (i.e. Freidson, 2001) owned by their educational staff, which justifies their request of better pay and working conditions as those ensured by the national labour collective agreements of the public sector.

Therefore, facing the practical impossibility of continuing to provide ECEC services with directly managed units, as happened in the last decade, local politicians and managers find different options according to the different ECEC service.

In the case of crèches, they can choose to take the risks of suffering from the social and political costs of “privatisation”, assuming that these costs will be limited and sustainable, or they can decide to soften the resistance by transferring their crèches to hybrid organisations. This is more likely to happen in areas with a historically rooted tradition even in services for 0-3 years-old, such as Emilia-Romagna or in big cities.

In the case of kindergartens, they could try to manage the increasing difficulties in continuing municipal provision by arranging a slow, indirect transfer of their places to the state kindergarten. Although this can be seen as

a loss in the local tradition and cultural patrimony, it will be considered a way to preserve the “publicness” of the school services, as well as the values connected to this feature.

When statalisation is not feasible, service outsourcing to hybrid organisations, controlled or owned by the municipalities, can soften the opposition by staff as well as by local communities, especially in areas where municipal kindergartens have a well-established reputation as high-quality services. This solution can also be seen as a compromise between the perspective of a statalisation, which would be chosen by unions and also by a part of the local community, and the contracting out to public providers, which municipal managers would prefer, in many cases, to hybridisation because of its major potential in reducing costs.

5. Conclusions

In order to extend service coverage or to give continuity to service provision, under conditions of austerity, Italian municipalities have increasingly resorted to outsourcing. However, this process played out differently in the two educational cycles of the ECEC system, having partially different recipients. These trends seem to further increase the differences between the two ECEC cycles, which the 2017 childcare reform should lead to an integration.

Outsourcing childcare services raises many risks in both cases. On one hand, as to crèches and other services for 0-2 years-old children, increase in private provision can lead to a worsening in staff pay and working conditions, because of the adoption of labour collective agreements of the private childcare sector instead of those of the public sector. Moreover, privatisation is likely to increase the level of fragmentation in the service quality. It could

also raise up the service costs for users and families, if fees are not substantially covered by public finance, increasing, in turn, the already existing inequalities in service access.

On the other hand, statalisation in kindergartens does not share these risks and, indeed, it promotes an improvement in staff pay and working conditions and should also favour a homogenisation in service organisation and regulation and, therefore, in service quality. However, homogenisation and levelling off the service could result in a general loss in terms of quality, given that municipal kindergartens (and crèches) not only often provide services with better quality, but they also play a pivotal role for all the ECEC system, being a model and a point of reference for all providers.

This last risk is enhanced by the financial difficulties of municipalities, since the 2017 childcare reform provides them with very important function in promoting an increase in service quality in all the ECEC system, coordinating and monitoring all the providers at local level.

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Appendix

Table 1 – Users attending a crèches according to the kind of provider 2000/2014

	Year 2000					Year 2014				
	Public	Private	Total	% Public	% Private	Public	Private	Total*	% Public**	% Private**
Piedmont	9.350	671	10.021	93	7	8.411	3.865	12.726	69	31
Valle d'Aosta	142	248	390	36	64	356	370	729	49	51
Liguria	2.601	463	3.064	85	15	3.080	1.311	4.434	70	30
Lombardy	18.817	2.812	21.629	87	13	19.801	10.707	36.158	65	35
Trentino-Alto Adige	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.960	2.735	4.721	42	58
Veneto	5.329	1.513	6.842	78	22	5.898	5.667	11.998	51	49
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1.179	458	1.637	72	28	1.753	1.123	5.595	61	39
Emilia-Romagna	14.072	2.215	16.287	86	14	16.606	9.906	27.471	63	37
Tuscany	7.402	1.216	8.618	86	14	8.112	7.360	17.996	52	48
Umbria	1.863	215	2.078	90	10	1.882	1.032	2.943	65	35
Marche	2.468	1.053	3.521	70	30	2.935	3.029	6.193	49	51
Lazio	8.997	1.909	10.906	82	18	15.632	10.983	26.876	59	41
Abruzzo	1.006	259	1.265	80	20	1.770	869	2.948	67	33
Molise	212	0	212	100	0	88	605	721	13	87
Campania	1.699	341	2.040	83	17	2.402	950	3.363	72	28
Apulia	2.212	412	2.624	84	16	1.856	2.214	5.027	46	54
Basilicata	257	482	739	35	65	429	408	839	51	49
Calabria	396	274	670	59	41	415	190	625	69	31
Sicily	7.143	630	7.773	92	8	5.146	1.087	6.284	83	17
Sardinia	1.030	1.280	2.310	45	55	1.210	2.184	3.515	36	64
ITALY	86.831	17.911	104.742	83	17	99.742	66.595	181.162	60	40

Source: elaborations on Istat (various years) and Idi (2002)

* The sum of the columns “public” and “private” does not correspond to the figures reported in the column “Total” because we have detracted the users getting contributions from municipalities because data do not distinguish whether they attend a public or private crèche (probably mainly a private one). ** Percentages calculated excluding the users getting contribution from the municipalities.

Table 2 – Users attending a kindergarten according to the kind of provider 2009-09/2014-15 (Source: elaborations on Istat datawarehouse)

	<i>School Year 2008-09</i>							<i>School Year 2014-15</i>						
	<i>State</i>	<i>Local Gov.</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% State</i>	<i>% Loc. Gov.</i>	<i>% Priv.</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Local Gov.</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% State</i>	<i>% Loc. Gov.</i>	<i>% Private</i>
Piedmont	69.212	9.865	31.500	110.577	63	9	28	72.968	9.317	31.722	114.007	64	8	28
Valle d'Aosta	=	2.996	501	3.497	=	86	14	=	3.108	503	3.611	=	86	14
Liguria	19.859	5.820	10.883	36.562	54	16	30	20.853	5.514	9.905	36.272	58	15	27
Lombardy	113.113	35.579	119.232	267.924	42	13	45	120.216	36.103	120.064	276.383	43	13	43
Trentino-Alto Adige*	=	21.534	10.348	31.882	=	68	32	=	22.518	10.446	32.964	=	68	32
Veneto	43.576	6.531	86.694	136.801	32	5	63	47.329	6.595	83.147	137.071	34	5	61
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	17.428	2.738	10.350	30.516	57	9	34	18.010	2.695	10.355	31.060	58	9	33
Emilia-Romagna	50.874	22.164	37.095	110.133	46	20	34	55.373	19.529	40.762	115.664	48	17	35
Tuscany	65.092	8.720	18.764	92.576	70	10	20	69.116	7.931	17.843	94.890	73	8	19
Umbria	17.872	782	4.169	22.823	78	4	18	19.417	631	3.764	23.812	81	3	16
Marche	33.972	2.102	4.975	41.049	83	5	12	35.780	1.995	4.290	42.065	85	5	10
Lazio	84.510	36.527	28.387	149.424	57	24	19	91.154	34.366	26.413	151.933	60	23	17
Abruzzo	27.712	685	6.001	34.398	81	2	17	29.979	466	5.520	35.965	83	1	16
Molise	5.926	115	1.378	7.419	80	1	19	6.160	96	1.217	7.473	83	1	16
Campania	130.597	9.166	52.771	192.534	68	5	27	133.247	6.935	45.229	185.411	72	4	24
Apulia	91.437	5.096	24.529	121.062	76	4	20	92.444	3.564	20.050	116.058	80	3	17
Basilicata	12.279	986	2.007	15.272	80	7	13	12.184	469	1.846	14.499	84	3	13
Calabria	42.779	606	14.730	58.115	74	1	25	44.415	468	13.782	58.665	76	1	23
Sicily	112.959	10.790	25.139	148.888	76	7	17	115.099	7.052	22.384	144.535	80	5	15
Sardinia	27.453	634	12.174	40.261	68	2	30	29.335	688	11.748	41.771	70	2	28
ITALY	966.650	183.436	501.627	1.651.713	59	11	30	1.013.079	153.772	480.851	1.647.702	62	9	29

